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ABSTRACT 
Ancillary services are defined as all those activities on the interconnected 
grid that are necessary to support the transmission of power while 
maintaining reliable operation and ensuring the required degree of quality 
and safety. There are several activities of the operator that come under the 
preview of ancillary services. The definitions of some services and 
distinctions between some of them are often unclear. 
This thesis attempts to examine three of the most important ancillary 
services provided by the independent system operator in a deregulated 
power system, that of maintaining the system voltage profile within 
acceptable limits, the system frequency around the nominal value and 
enough of spinning reserves to maintain the system security. A broad 
overview of how reactive power, spinning reserves and frequency regulation 
services are managed by the system operator in deregulated electricity 
markets around the world has been provided in the thesis. Subsequently, the 
thesis proposes models for participants in reactive power, spinning reserve 
and frequency regulation service markets to submit their offers. The thesis 
further deals with the optimal procurement of these ancillary services by the 
independent system operator. The optimal procurement schemes seek to 
achieve the most beneficial plan for the system, from both technical and 
economical perspectives. It is observed that the classical models for reactive 
power optimization or frequency control need to be refined and adjusted to 
suit the requirements of present day competitive electricity markets. 
 
Keywords: deregulation, electricity market, ancillary services, reactive 
power, spinning reserve, frequency regulation and optimal power flow. 
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION* 
1.1 POWER INDUSTRY DEREGULATION AND EMERGENCE 
OF ANCILLARY SERVICES 
The electric power industry has over the years been dominated by large 
utilities that had an overall authority over all activities in generation, 
transmission and distribution of power within its domain of operation. Such 
utilities have been referred to as vertically integrated utilities, and these 
served as the only electricity supplier in the region and were obliged to 
provide electricity to everyone. 
Since the past decade, power utilities worldwide have been going through 
a process of reforms in order to introduce commercial incentives in 
generation, transmission and distribution. The main objectives of the 
reforms are achieved through a clear separation between production and sale 
of electricity, and network operations. The erstwhile vertically integrated 
generation, transmission and distribution system operations have been 
separated into independent activities. The generation companies and power 
stations sell energy through competitive long-term contracts with customers 
or by bidding for short-term energy supply at the spot market [1], [2]. 
Transmission is still a monopoly since the economics of scale are very 
high. Transmission open access has proved to be an important requirement 
in deregulated systems. To guarantee a level playing field for the generators 
and customers to access the transmission network, the transmission system 
operator is required to be independent from other market participants. 
The Independent System Operator (ISO) has acquired a central 
coordination role and carries out the important responsibility of providing 
for system reliability and security. It manages system operations, such as 
                                                          
* Some parts of this chapter has been published as the following paper: 
• J. Zhong and K. Bhattacharya, “Reactive power management in deregulated electricity 
markets – A review,” Proceedings of IEEE Power Engineering Society Winter Meeting, 
New York, January 2002, pp.1287-1292. 
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scheduling and operating the transmission-related services. The ISO also has 
to ensure a required degree of quality and safety, provide corrective 
measures when faced with incidents, and several other functions. In addition, 
the ISO could also manage market administration, energy auction and unit 
commitment functions in the pool market structure. 
To this effect, certain services, such as, scheduling and dispatch, 
frequency regulation, voltage control, generation reserves, etc. are required 
by the power system, apart from the basic energy and power delivery 
services. Such services, which are now commonly referred to as ancillary 
services, had all along been part of the normal electricity supply and were 
not separated in the traditional vertically integrated power systems. 
Ancillary services are also referred to as Interconnected Operation Services 
by the North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC). 
However, in deregulated power systems, transmission networks are 
available for third-party access to allow power wheeling, and spot markets 
for electricity have developed in many countries. In such a deregulated 
environment, the ancillary services are no longer treated as integral to the 
electricity supply. They are unbundled and priced separately, and system 
operators have to purchase ancillary services from ancillary service 
providers.  
Issues pertaining to costing of ancillary services and hence appropriate 
pricing mechanisms for all market participants to recover the costs become 
an important issue for proper functioning of the system. 
1.1.1 Ancillary Services as seen by Customers, Power 
Producers and the Operators  
For the customer, ancillary services are integrated to its electricity supply 
and are thus not separately distinguishable. Any customer connected to the 
network is implicitly a consumer of ancillary services through continuity of 
the supply and the quality of supply it is receiving. This is true for any 
category of customer. 
For power producers, whether they are vertically integrated utilities or 
independent power producers, ancillary services are mainly defined by the 
basic contributions they make to fulfill the system functions. Besides the 
supply of active power, they supply or absorb reactive power and control the 
voltage as well as contribute to maintaining the system frequency. In 
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addition, there are other services to improve the system operation, such as 
follow-up of daily load, supply of reliable forecast information particularly 
on availability, contribution to restoring voltage following an incident and 
therefore the capacity to trip house load, etc. 
Finally, the power system operator ensures the link between the power 
producers and customers. It collects the basic contributions of power 
producers, incorporates them into the economic management of the system 
while adding its own contribution and provides carefully worked out 
services to assure continuous supply to customers. All this calls for 
resources and implies costs. It therefore raises the problem of evaluating the 
cost for the system, compensation of service suppliers and the allocation of 
costs to service customers. 
1.1.2 Ancillary Services’ Classifications and Definitions 
Ancillary services are those services provided by the equipment in the 
system and generators that generate, control, and transmit electricity in 
support of the basic services of generating capacity, energy supply, and 
power delivery. These services are necessary to support the transmission of 
power while maintaining system reliability and ensuring the required degree 
of quality and safety.  
In this section, we discuss the NERC definitions of ten ancillary services 
[3].  
Category-1: Services required for routine operation 
¾ System Control 
The control area operator functions that schedule generation and 
transactions and control generation in real-time to maintain 
generation/load balance. 
¾ Voltage Control 
The injection or absorption of reactive power from generators or 
capacitors to maintain system voltages within required ranges. 
¾ Regulation 
The use of generation or load to maintain minute-to-minute 
generation/load balance within the control area. 
¾ Load Following/Energy Imbalance 
The use of generation to meet the hour-to-hour and daily variations in 
load. 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
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Category-2: Services needed to prevent an outage from becoming a 
catastrophe  
¾ Spinning Reserves 
The provision of unloaded generating capacity that is synchronized to 
the grid and can immediately respond to correct for generation/load 
imbalances, caused by generation and/or transmission outages, and that 
is fully available within several minutes. 
¾ Supplemental Reserves 
The provision of generating capacity and curtailable load to correct for 
generation/load imbalances, caused by generation and/or transmission 
outages, and that is fully available within several minutes. However, 
unlike spinning reserves, supplemental reserve is not required to respond 
immediately. 
¾ Network Stability Services 
Maintenance and use of special equipment (power-system stabilizers and 
dynamic-braking resistors) to maintain a secure transmission system. 
In addition to these three services, voltage control service falling in 
Category-1 can also act like Category-2 services and prevent voltages from 
decaying so far that voltage collapse occurs, and system control is required 
to manage these services. 
Category-3: Services needed to restore the system after a blackout 
¾ System Blackstart Capability 
The ability of a generating unit to proceed from a shutdown condition to 
an operating condition without assistance from the electrical grid and 
then to energize the grid to help other units start after a blackout occurs. 
System blackstart, along with several of the services discussed above 
(system control, voltage control, network stability, contingency reserves, 
regulation, and load following), is required to rebuild the electrical grid after 
system blackouts. 
1.1.3 Scope of this Work 
The work presented in this thesis examines in detail the functioning of three 
particular services from amongst the ten services defined by NERC and 
discussed in the previous sub-section. These are as follows: 
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• Reactive power service provided by generators 
• Spinning reserve service 
• Frequency regulation service 
In all the cases, the work attempts to develop an integrated market design 
for the said service that is fair and competitive and can be applicable to the 
ISO as a procurement tool for the services. In the following sub-sections, we 
shall discuss some of the aspects of how these ancillary services are 
organized and managed by the system operators in different deregulated 
markets around the world. 
1.2 GLOBAL OVERVIEW OF ANCILLARY SERVICE 
MANAGEMENT 
1.2.1 New York ISO 
In the New York control area, ancillary services are provided by the New 
York ISO (NYISO) or procured by the transmission customers and suppliers 
themselves. The NYISO coordinates the provision of all ancillary services 
and directly arranges for those services that are not self-supplied. Due to the 
nature of the services, either market-based or embedded cost-based prices 
are used to price these services. In Table 1.1, the service provider and 
pricing method for each service are given. 
 
Table 1.1 NYISO ancillary services details 
Ancillary Service Who provides the service? NYISO, or Self-Supplied (SS) 
What is the pricing method 
for the Ancillary Service? 
Scheduling, System 
Control and Dispatch NYISO Embedded Cost Based 
Voltage Support NYISO Embedded Cost Based 
Regulation and 
Frequency Response NYISO or SS Market-based 
Energy Imbalance NYISO Market-based 
Operating Reserve NYISO or SS Market-based 
Black Start Capability NYISO Embedded Cost Based 
Transmission customers and suppliers are permitted to self-supply 
operating reserve service, regulation and frequency response service. They 
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must bid the required resource into ancillary services market. The NYISO 
selects the successful bidders to provide each service [4]. 
1.2.1.1 Reactive Power Service 
The NYISO is responsible for providing reactive power support services, 
and this is provided at embedded cost-based prices. Generating resources, 
which operate within their capability limits, are directed by NYISO to 
produce / absorb reactive power to maintain voltages within their limits. The 
pricing method for the reactive power support service is an embedded cost 
based price [4].  
The cost of reactive power support includes the following: 
• The total annual embedded cost for payment 
• Any applicable lost opportunity cost to provide reactive power service 
• Total of prior year payments to suppliers of reactive power service less 
the total of payments received by the NYISO from transmission 
customers in the prior year for reactive power service. 
Lost Opportunity Cost 
If the NYISO dispatches or directs a generator to reduce its real power 
output in order to allow the unit to produce or absorb more reactive power, 
the generator may receive a component of payment accounting for the Lost 
Opportunity Cost (LOC). The method for calculating the LOC is based on 
the following factors: 
• Real time long-term based marginal price (LBMP) 
• Original real power dispatch and the new dispatch point 
• Bid curve of generator supplying reactive power service 
Figure 1.1 describes the calculation of the lost opportunity cost for a 
generator, which decreases its real power output to provide more reactive 
power service. In Figure 1.1, PRT is the Long-term Based Marginal Price 
(LBMP), and f(P) is the bid curve of the generator supplying reactive power 
support. D1 and D2 are the original and new dispatch points respectively 
while B1 and B2 are the corresponding bid prices at D1 and D2. 
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Figure 1.1. Method for calculating Lost Opportunity Cost by NYISO 
As the real power output is decreased, the generator receives lesser 
revenue from the sell of energy although by way of this reduced generation, 
it saves some generating cost. The reduced income for the generator (∆R) 
can be described by equation (1.1). 
( ) ( )∫ ⋅−−=
=∆
1
2
D
D
21RT dPPfDDP 
cost generating reduced from Savings- loss RevenueR
 (1.1) 
The first term in (1.1) denotes the revenue lost by the generator while 
backing down its real power output from D1 to D2, and the second term 
denotes the corresponding reduction in generation cost. Note that, ∆R also 
equals the savings to the ISO. The saving of the generator (∆S) from reduced 
real power output is described in equation (1.2), 
∫ ⋅−−=∆ 1
2
D
D
211 dPf(P))DD(BS  (1.2) 
The LOC of the generator equals to the difference between ∆R and ∆S; 
)DD()BP(LOC 211RT −×−=  (1.3) 
1.2.1.2 Regulation and Frequency Response Service of New York ISO 
The NYISO offers regulation and frequency response services within the 
New York (NY) control area. Regulation and frequency response services 
are necessary for the continuous balancing of generation with load and NY 
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control area interchange, and to assist in maintaining frequency at 60 Hz. 
This service is accomplished by committing on-line generators, 
predominately through the use of automatic generation control, to follow 
moment-to-moment changes in load. 
Regulation service is bid into the market by individual units that have 
AGC capability and that wish to participate in the regulation market. Bid 
information includes regulation response rate (MW/min) and regulation 
availability rate ($/MW). The NYISO selects regulation service in the day-
ahead market from all bidders.  
The bids submitted by suppliers are stacked from the lowest priced offer 
to the highest priced, taking into account the operational requirements for up 
and down regulation. The NYISO selects the bids starting with the lowest 
bid, and the last selected bid is set as market clearing price. All suppliers 
selected in the market receive an availability payment calculated with the 
corresponding market clearing price. 
The NYISO has a Performance Tracking System to monitor the 
performance of generators that provide regulation service. Payments by the 
NYISO to each supplier of this service are based in part on the generator’s 
performance with respect to expectations.  
The NYISO makes the following settlement with suppliers of regulation 
service: 
• An hourly availability payment for reserving capability to provide 
regulation service 
• An energy payment based on the amount of regulation provided 
• A financial penalty based on poor performance as measured against 
expectations 
1.2.2 California ISO 
In the California system, the ISO procures reactive power support services 
on long-term contracts from reliable must-run generating units [5]. The 
actual short-term requirement is determined on a day-ahead basis, after the 
real power market is settled and the energy demand and schedules are 
known. Thereafter the ISO determines the location-wise amount of reactive 
power required based on system power flow analysis. Daily voltage 
schedules are issued to contracted generators and the transmission operators 
within the region. 
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The generators are mandated to provide reactive power within the power 
factor range of 0.90 lag to 0.95 lead (Figure 1.2). For reactive power 
absorption / generation beyond these limits, the generators are financially 
compensated for, including, a payment if they are required to reduce their 
real power output. 
        No Payment in this Region
Generator receives
financial compensation
0
Armature
current limit
Under-excitation limit
Field current limit
PMax
Q, MVAr
P, MW
0.9 pf Lag
0.95 pf Lead
 
Figure 1.2. The mandatory (no payment) reactive power requirement and the ancillary 
service component that receives financial compensation in the California system 
1.2.3 PJM Interconnection 
The Pennsylvania - New Jersey - Maryland (PJM) inter-connection 
restructured its operations in 1997 and PJM was established as the ISO. As 
per the report of the Market Monitoring Unit [6] and [7], reactive power was 
recognized as an ancillary service by PJM and two distinct components were 
segregated. The first component was the reactive capability at rated capacity 
of a generator while the second was the reactive capability at reduced 
generator output levels. 
It has been mandated that reactive power supply and voltage control 
services will be provided directly by the individual transmission providers. 
The transmission providers in turn have defined the tariff rates for their 
customers, in this case, load serving entities either within the zone or outside. 
For the first component, i.e., the reactive capability at rated capacity, the 
customer pays a charge proportional to the total generation owner’s monthly 
revenue requirement and the amount of monthly use of the network. 
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Regarding the second component, generators are paid for their 
opportunity costs incurred as a result of increasing their reactive power 
production by reducing real power output. This is paid only to those 
generators that are directed to operate in such a mode and the opportunity 
cost is equal to the locational marginal price less the generator’s bid for each 
MW that they back down. 
1.2.4 United Kingdom 
In the UK system, National Grid Company (NGC) carries out the role of the 
ISO and hence is also responsible for making arrangements with regards to 
ancillary services. It operates the transmission system with the objective of 
providing a reliable supply and maintaining voltage and frequency within 
the standards specified.  
Therefore NGC contracts for ancillary services to enable voltage and 
frequency control standards to be maintained, as well as other services such 
as the black start capability. Generators, regional electricity companies, large 
consumers or even external members can supply these services. One of the 
key tasks of the ancillary services business is to encourage competition in 
the provision of ancillary services. The Grid Code details the technical 
operational requirements of NGC and defines two major categories of 
ancillary services, system ancillary services and commercial ancillary 
services. These are briefly described below [8]. 
System Ancillary Services 
These services are fundamental to the satisfactory operation of the system 
and all generating units connected to either the NGC transmission system or 
a supplier’s distribution system in England and Wales must be able to 
provide this. System ancillary services are classified in two categories. 
Part-1: Those services, which all generators are obliged to provide 
• Reactive Energy: Other than that supplied by means of synchronous 
or static voltage compensators. 
• Operating Margin (for frequency control): Capability to provide 
additional output from a generating unit with a short notice. 
Part-2: Services that need not be provided at every site. NGC buys these 
services from sites based on specific contracts 
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• Operating Margin (for frequency control): Capability of a gas turbine 
or pumped storage unit to fast start 
• Black Start Capabilities 
Commercial Ancillary Services 
The other services are called the commercial ancillary services, which the 
generators are not obliged to provide and hence are subject to commercial 
agreements. Such services are as under: 
• Reactive energy: supplied by synchronous or static voltage 
compensators 
• Operating margin: provided by pumped storage units, load reduction, 
stand-by generation, etc. 
1.2.4.1 Reactive Power Service 
The Grid Code places a minimum obligation on all generating units, with a 
power generating capacity more than 50 MW, to provide a basic (mandatory) 
reactive power service. In order to receive payment for this service, the 
generators must enter into a Default Payment Mechanism (DPM). 
Alternately, the generators can offer the mandatory reactive power service 
through the tender market by structuring their bids to reflect the value that 
they perceive their service is worth. This way of meeting the mandatory Grid 
Code with a market mechanism is termed as Obligatory Reactive Power 
Service (ORPS). The income a generator could receive by providing reactive 
power varies according to the number of generators who can provide that 
service within a zone and the relative need [9]. Further, generators with 
reactive power capability in excess of the Grid Code can offer an Enhanced 
Reactive Power Service (ERPS).   
The Default Payment Mechanism was initially (in 1997/98 when the 
scheme was started) based on two components -- a capability payment 
component and an actual utilization based payment component with a ratio 
of 80:20. This ratio underwent a staircase phasing of the capability 
component and since April 2000, the ratio has been 0:100 and Default 
Payment Mechanism is based on metered reactive utilization only (Figure 
1.3). 
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Figure 1.3. Tender bid price structure for reactive power utilisation 
1.2.5 Sweden 
The Swedish electricity market is dominated by bilateral contracts between 
suppliers and customers although share of energy being traded in the spot 
market is increasing. The bilaterally contracted transactions are usually on a 
long-term basis and generally finalized months ahead. Once these 
transactions are finalized, and the daily spot-market trading is settled, the 
suppliers and customers send information of these trades and generation 
schedules to Svenska Kraftnät who is thereafter responsible for safe system 
operation. Svenska Kraftnät, the ISO, procures and provides the ancillary 
services required, in order to satisfy the system operation requirements. With 
regard to ancillary service, both reserve and regulation services are acquired 
by Svenska Kraftnät through the regulating markets. Svenska Kraftnät 
additionally pays balancing entities for governor response and load matching 
on fixed contracts. 
Svenska Kraftnät is also responsible for the short term planning of the 
Swedish transmission system operation with regard to voltage quality, 
continuity of service and coordination of the national balance between 
generation and consumption, accounting for the electricity imports and 
exports. 
In order to maintain the electricity demand supply balance on a minute-
by-minute basis, a two-tier approach is adopted. The primary regulation is 
based on automatic frequency control on generators in suitable power 
stations. Svenska Kraftnät purchases long-term contracts from generating 
companies for such primary regulation. The secondary regulation is carried 
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out by activating the most favorable bids (for quantity and price) from 
generators willing to increase or decrease their generation; or even 
consumers willing to increase or decrease their consumption. 
At the end of each hour, the costs are distributed based on the individual 
players’ unbalance data and the type of regulation (up or down regulation) 
called for by the system operator. The hourly regulating price is fixed as the 
price for the most expensive measure (regulating up- balance service 
purchases) or least expensive measures (regulating down- balance service 
sells) utilized during the hour. 
Presently no compensation is paid to generators for reactive power. Load 
shedding is recognized as an ancillary service, but not compensated. No 
other ancillary services are recognized. 
1.2.5.1 Reactive Power Management 
The Swedish electricity system is characterized by bulk power flows from 
the north, where a major share of generation is located, to the south, where 
most of the load centers are, over long distance transmission lines. As 
reactive power cannot be transmitted over such distances, it should be 
provided by local sources. Svenska Kraftnät owns the national grid (400 kV 
and 220 kV), and also carries out the responsibilities of the ISO while the 
regional and local network companies operate the sub-transmission and 
distribution networks (130 kV and less) [10]. 
Reactive power services are provided on a mandatory basis in Sweden 
although various schemes for financial compensation to the providers of this 
service are being considered. The reactive power exchange on the national 
grid is controlled by instructions from Svenska Kraftnät. It is recommended 
that reactive power flow between different parts of the grid be kept ‘near 
zero’. The ISO has the right to the supply of reactive power from spinning 
generators directly connected to the national grid. 
The regional network companies are responsible for voltage control in 
their respective areas. Under normal conditions the regional network 
operators use as much static reactive power production as possible. Large 
generators are rarely used for secondary voltage control and are reserved for 
serious situations. Such units operate at a constant reactive power output, 
with a stable operating point considering vibration and losses. 
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Formal Agreements for Reactive Power Transfer over the Grid 
For power transactions over the network, Svenska Kraftnät enters into 
formal agreements for reactive power exchange with independent generators 
and regional networks. Agreement for feeding power into the national grid is 
mostly with producers but in certain cases, can also be with regional 
networks. Following are some of the standard set of agreements: 
¾ A hydro unit connected directly to the national grid is required 
(mandatory) to be able to inject as well as absorb reactive power as per 
the following limits. 
 P
3
1 Injection Reactive Max=  
  P
6
1 Absorption Reactive Max=  
¾ A thermal unit connected directly to the national grid is required 
(mandatory) to maintain capability of reactive power injection as per the 
limits, given below. However, it has no requirement on absorption of 
reactive power. 
  P
3
1  Injection Reactive Max=   
¾ A regional network with agreement to inject real power into the national 
grid is required to maintain a capability to inject reactive power, 
depending on the instantaneous real power injection, as given below. 
ousinstantaneP3
1 Injection Reactive =  
There is no requirement on absorption of reactive power from the national 
grid. Also there is no specific requirement from a generator connected to 
the regional grid. 
¾ A regional network with agreement for drawing real power from the 
national grid, there is no requirement for injection or absorption of 
reactive power to/from the national grid. 
1.2.5.2 Conventions and Practices for Frequency Control 
The nominal frequency in the Nordic system is 50 Hz and it is stipulated that 
fluctuations during normal system operations should not exceed 0.1 Hz. The 
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nuclear units are set to trip below a frequency of 47.5 Hz, hence the 
frequency should, under no circumstances, go below this. This situation 
could be alleviated by load curtailment schemes. At frequencies higher than 
51 Hz, the thermal units are set to reduce their outputs automatically. 
Primary Frequency Control 
The primary frequency control has the responsibility to cover unbalances 
due to spontaneous load variations and mismatches between planned 
generation and actual load level. The total primary frequency reserves in 
Sweden have to meet the following requirements: 
Total reserve margin at 50 Hz: 240 MW 
Total gain, at least: 2400 MW/Hz.  
Each country in the Nordic system is responsible for a part of the total 
margin and gain determined for the Nordic system in relation to the annual 
energy consumption of the system. Technically, the capacity margin 
required for primary frequency control is provided by hydro units. The 
various operator actions that are initiated when frequency in the Nordel 
system deviates from its nominal value are shown in Figure 1.4 [11].  
53 52 51 50 49 48 47
R
is
k 
of
 tr
ip
pi
ng
 o
f
th
er
m
al
 u
ni
ts
Frequency
Fo
rc
ed
 re
du
ct
io
n 
of
ge
ne
ra
tio
n
N
om
in
al
 F
re
qu
en
cy
Em
er
ge
nc
y 
C
on
tro
l
A
ut
om
at
ic
 lo
ad
sh
ed
di
ng
Tr
ip
pi
ng
 o
f l
ar
ge
th
er
m
al
 u
ni
ts
 
Figure 1.4. Frequency range and operator action in the Nordel system 
Balance Services for Secondary Frequency Control 
Svenska Kraftnät operates a balance service, which is used for secondary 
regulation, to continuously balance the country’s electricity generation and 
consumption. It accepts bids -volume (power in MW) and price (SEK/MWh) 
from generators willing to quickly (max 10 minutes) increase or decrease 
generation, or even consumers willing to increase or decrease consumption. 
The bids for regulation are arranged in price order to form a "staircase" for 
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each operating hour (Figure 1.5). When regulation is needed, the system 
operator activates the most profitable bid for regulating up or down.  
At the end of each hour, the regulation price is determined in accordance 
with the most expensive measure taken during upward regulation (the 
purchase of balance energy), or the cheapest measure taken during 
downward regulation (the sell of balance energy), used during the hour as in 
Figure 1.5. The final regulation price applies to all those selected to regulate 
the balance upwards or downwards. 
Price
(SEK/MWh)
(- MW)
Volume
Regulation price (up)
• if up-regulation called
•  same for all called
Market
price
Bids for regulation
Regulation price (down)
• if down-regulation called
•  same for all called
(+ MW)
 
Figure 1.5 Balance Regulation Bids 
1.2.6 Finland 
The Finnish ISO, Fingrid is responsible for maintenance of system voltages 
and accordingly, it supplies reactive power as per the general supply 
principles concerning reactive power. The voltage level of the main grid is 
controlled using reactors and capacitors. The voltage ratio between different 
voltage steps is controlled with tap changers of the transformers. 
Fingrid is also responsible for the maintenance of adequate reactive power 
reserves in the Finnish power system. This is done through the use of its 
own resources and also by acquiring reactive reserves from independent 
parties [12]. This provision for reactive power reserves is a mandatory 
service as of now. It is likely that a tariff mechanism for financial 
compensation will be in place for this service in the near future. 
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As per the guidelines, generators of more than 10 MVA rating are 
required to maintain reactive power reserves during the normal status of the 
power system: 
• For generators connected to the 400 kV grid, the entire reactive 
capacity should be available as momentary reserves and mandatory, 
with the exception of that amount consumed by transformers and the 
plant itself.  
• For generators connected to 220 kV and 110 kV grid, the mandatory 
momentary reactive power reserve should not be less than half of the 
calculated reactive capacity corresponding to a power factor of 0.9. 
The rest can be used as a commercial service.  
• For generators connected to the grid at voltage levels less than 110 kV, 
half of the reactive power intake capacity at the generator’s voltage 
level, is also required to be reserved as momentary disturbance reserve 
and mandatory. 
1.2.7 Australia 
In Australia the National Electricity Market Management Company 
(NEMMCO) is the ISO, and hence responsible for system security, 
procurement and scheduling of various ancillary services. Seven services are 
recognized for procurement and compensation and these are categorized in 
five system control activities as follows [13]: 
¾ Frequency control services 
• Automatic generation control: This service is required from a 
generator within five minutes of the ISO request. 
• Governor control: This service is based on the generator’s governor 
droop characteristic and aids in frequency control, acting in a 1 second 
to 1 minute time frame. 
• Rapid generator unit loading: This service requires generators not in 
operation to synchronize with the system within a five minutes time 
frame.  
• Load shedding: This service requires curtailment of load following 
extreme frequency variations. The loads are expected to automatically 
respond and disconnect within a one-minute time frame. 
¾ Voltage control services 
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• Reactive power: This service is provided to keep system voltages at 
desired levels by injection or absorption of reactive power at different 
nodes in the system. The financial compensation in this scheme is 
provided only to generators and synchronous compensators. 
¾ Stability control services 
• Rapid generator unit unloading: This requires a generator to unload 
rapidly from its normal operating condition in order to preserve 
system stability. This may be required under certain circumstances 
and is recognized as a system stability service. 
¾ Network loading control services 
• Automatic generation control 
• Load shedding 
These have been discussed above in the context of frequency control 
services. These two services are also recognized as network loading 
control services. 
¾ System restart services 
• System restart is similar to the black start capability service discussed 
in the context of NERC. This requires that the generator is able to 
supply the transmission system following a complete system failure. 
Payment Mechanisms 
The payments to the ancillary service providers have been organized in 
the Australian market based on the type of service provided and the 
providers’ costs, including opportunity costs if any. Four categories of 
payment mechanisms are recognized and a particular service may call for 
one or more of the components for compensation. 
¾ Availability payment: This is made to those services that require the 
provider’s preparedness for providing the services when called for. This 
payment is applicable to system restart services and reactive power 
services from generating units. 
¾ Enabling payment: This payment is made if a concerned service has been 
enabled (or activated) by the ISO for use. This applies to all the ancillary 
services except for system restart and reactive power from generators, 
although reactive power service from synchronous compensators is 
eligible for this payment. 
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¾ Usage payment: This payment is based on actual use of the concerned 
ancillary service by the ISO and applies only to the rapid loading and 
rapid unloading services provided by generating units. 
¾ Compensation payment: This payment is based on the provider’s 
opportunity costs and is paid when the concerned provider has been 
constrained from operating according to its market decisions. This 
payment is applicable to all categories of services except reactive support 
service from synchronous compensators and system restart services. 
1.2.7.2 Reactive Power Service 
All reactive power ancillary service providers are eligible for the availability 
payment component - for their preparedness in providing the service when 
called for. Further, the synchronous compensators also receive an enabling 
payment component - when their service is activated by the ISO for use. On 
the other hand, a synchronous generator receives the compensation payment 
component - based on its opportunity cost, and paid when it has been 
constrained from operating according to its market decisions. The total 
payment for reactive power service is shown in Figure 1.6. 
Payment for
Reactive
Power
AVAILABILITY
COMPONENT
ENABLING
COMPONENT
(for synchronous
compensators only)
COMPENSATION
COMPONENT
(Generators only)
 
Figure 1.6. Payment for Reactive Power 
The provision for reactive power from generators is separated in two 
categories:  
• The mandatory reactive power support, and 
• Reactive power as an ancillary service 
As explained in Figure 1.7, it is mandatory for the generators to provide 
reactive power within the operating power factors of 0.9 lagging and 0.93 
leading. Beyond this mandatory component, is the ancillary service 
component, which is left to the generators to offer. However, there is a 
portion beyond the ancillary service component, which is left undefined [14]. 
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Figure 1.7. Generator Reactive Power Definitions in the Australian Market 
1.2.7.3 Frequency Control Ancillary Service 
Frequency control ancillary services provided by NEMMCO are concerned 
with balancing the supply and demand over short time intervals, and are 
separated into: 
a. small frequency deviation capability 
b. large frequency deviation capability 
The small deviation service is used to keep the system frequency stable 
around 50 Hz under normal operating conditions, while the large frequency 
deviation service is used to recover the system frequency following larger 
disturbances [15]. Small frequency deviations could arise from demand 
variations, demand forecast error and non-conforming scheduled participants. 
The causes for large deviations can be generation / demand changes 
(planned and unplanned), and network contingencies that isolate generators.  
The quantity of frequency control ancillary service requirement in various 
categories, together with the efficiency of providing it, will determine its 
ultimate cost. It depends on the potential size of the frequency deviations 
from credible contingencies and speed of response.  
To meet the frequency control ancillary service requirement, governor 
control, automatic generation control and demand management options are 
used. For large deviations, network outage management, load shedding and 
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rapid generator response options are used in addition to the above options 
(Figure 1.8) [16]. 
Automatic
Generation
Control
Rapid
Generator
Unit Loading
Load
Shedding
Governor
Control
Frequency
Cotrol
 
Figure 1.8 Framework of Frequency Control 
Governor Control 
The inherent ability of a generating unit’s governor to correct the system 
frequency within a six to sixty second time frame. 
Automatic Generation Control 
The ability of a generating unit to respond to signals from the system 
operator in order to correct the system frequency within five-minute 
targets and prevent overloading of network elements. 
Rapid Generator Unit Loading 
The ability of a generator to deliver energy to the system from stand still 
in order to correct the system frequency within a five-minute time frame. 
Load Shedding 
The ability to automatically disconnect load in response to an extreme 
frequency deviation within a six to sixty second time frame, to correct 
frequency or to prevent overloading of network elements. 
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NEMMCO procures the frequency control ancillary service requirement 
and financial compensation to contracted parties are made based on the 
following three components: 
• Enabling Component: a payment based on the quantity of capability 
made ready for use by the contracted providers in the dispatch process. 
• Usage Component: a payment for some services (specifically load 
shedding) based on the actual use of the service – such payment does 
not apply to governors providing the instantaneous control.  
• Compensation Component: compensation based on the assessed 
opportunity costs of backing off energy-producing units from their 
position in the energy market to provide the service. 
1.3 OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS 
Chapter-2 discusses the various issues involved in considering reactive 
power as an ancillary service. We examine the reactive power costing issues 
for supply of reactive power from synchronous generators. Subsequently, a 
bidding structure for reactive power has been proposed that take into account 
the costing issues. A method is developed to obtain the optimal contracts 
based on the ISO’s objective of maximizing the social welfare. 
 
In Chapter-3, a competitive market for reactive power services has been 
designed. Four components of uniform market prices for reactive power are 
obtained through a compromise programming based market settlement 
model. Different scenarios for simultaneous and individual gamings have 
been constructed to examine the extent of market power prevailing in the 
reactive power market.   
 
In Chapter-4, the reactive power market is considered to be separated into 
voltage control areas, and uniform prices are obtained for individual voltage 
control areas. Analysis has been carried out to examine whether such a 
market is more desirable than a common system-wide reactive power market. 
 
In Chapter-5, a spinning reserve service market is designed. A bidding 
structure for spinning reserve has been proposed and a market-clearing price 
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for the service is obtained by minimizing the payment. Analysis has been 
carried out to examine how ISO’s procurements are affected by market 
imperfection. 
 
In Chapter-6, a price-based frequency regulation service has been proposed, 
where an optimization framework is developed to obtain the market clearing 
prices for both primary and secondary regulation services. Thereafter, a 
dynamic simulation model demonstrates the effectiveness of the price-based 
frequency regulation services. 
 
Chapter-7 draws the important conclusions from this thesis and discusses the 
future scope of work in ancillary service markets. 
 
 
 
Chapter 2 Reactive Power as an Ancillary Service 
 24
CHAPTER 2  
REACTIVE POWER AS AN ANCILLARY 
SERVICE* 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The power transmission capability available from a transmission line design 
is limited by technological and economical constraints. Therefore, in order 
to maximize the amount of real power that can be transferred over a network, 
reactive-power flows must be minimized. Consequently, sufficient reactive 
power should be provided locally in the system to keep the bus voltages 
within nominal ranges in order to satisfy customers’ equipment voltage 
ratings. 
The reactive devices have different characteristics in terms of dynamics 
and speed of response, ability of voltage changes, capital costs, operating 
costs, and opportunity costs. For example, synchronous generators are very 
fast reactive support devices, but have high opportunity costs if real-power 
output has to be reduced to produce more reactive power. Opportunity cost 
of reactive power is the benefit or profit that could otherwise be harnessed, 
but is given up by the reactive power supplier in order to generate reactive 
power. On the other hand, capacitors are slow and have poor performance 
                                                          
* Some parts of this chapter has been published in the following papers: 
• K. Bhattacharya and J. Zhong, “Reactive power as an ancillary service”, IEEE 
Transactions on Power Systems, Vol.16, No.2May 2001, pp. 294-300. 
• K. Bhattacharya and J. Zhong, “Closure to Discussion by Carson Taylor, on Reactive 
Power as an Ancillary Service”, IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, Vol.17, No.2, May 
2002, pp.523-524. 
• J. Zhong and K. Bhattacharya, “Optimum Var support procurement for maintenance of 
contracted transactions,” Proceedings of International Conference on Electric Utility 
Deregulation, Restructuring and Power Technologies (DRPT2000), London, April 2000, 
pp. 636-641. 
• J. Zhong, K. Bhattacharya and J. Daalder, “Reactive power as an ancillary service: Issues 
in optimal procurement”, Proceedings of IEEE-PES/CSEE International Conference on 
Power System Technology (POWERCON), Perth, Australia, December 2000, pp.885-890. 
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but are cheap to install and operate. The characteristics of different types of 
voltage-control equipment are given in Table 2.1 [17]. 
Table 2.1. Characteristics of different types of voltage control equipment 
Equipment 
Type 
Speed of 
Response 
Ability to support 
voltage 
Capital Cost
(per kVAr)
Operating 
Cost 
Opportunity 
Cost 
Synchronous 
Generator Fast 
Excellent, additional 
short-term capacity
Difficult to 
separate High Yes 
Synchronous 
Condenser Fast 
Excellent, additional 
short-term capacity $30-35 High No 
Capacitor Slow, stepped Poor, drops with V
2 $8-10 Very low No 
Static VAR 
compensator Fast Poor, drops with V
2 $45-50 Moderate No 
In vertically integrated electricity systems, reactive power support was 
part of the system operator’s activities and the expenses incurred in 
providing for such services were included within the electricity tariff 
charged to customers.  
In deregulated electricity markets, provision for reactive power support 
needs to be made by the ISO in order to meet the contracted transactions in a 
secure manner. Since it is not desirable to transport reactive power over the 
network, procurement of reactive power services should be done taking into 
account the perceived demand conditions, mix of the load and availability of 
reactive power resources. Most often, the independent generators or 
customers own the resources for reactive support such as synchronous 
generators, synchronous condensers, capacitor banks, reactors, static var 
compensators and FACTS devices, and the ISO needs to enter into contracts 
with them for such provision. 
In the White Paper on Proposed Standards for Interconnected Operations 
Services of NERC [18], it has been notified that only generation sources 
shall be entitled to provide reactive power, as an ancillary service. The other 
entities providing reactive support shall not be eligible for any financial 
compensation. However, the operating authority coordinates the use of static 
reactive supply devices throughout the system. Also all synchronous 
generators are required to be operating with their excitation system in 
automatic voltage control mode so that the generators’ reactive power 
outputs during emergency conditions do not fall short of the reactive 
capability. This is particularly useful when the generators are operating at 
points higher than rated real power wherein the armature current heating 
limits restrict the reactive power output. 
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As we have already discussed in Chapter-1, reactive power management 
and payment mechanisms vary for each deregulated electricity market. 
Usually the ISO enters into contracts with reactive power providers for their 
service provisions. In the US context, as per the NERC’s Operating Policy-
10 [19], only that reactive power provided by synchronous generators are 
considered ancillary services and can receive financial compensation for 
their services. This is also true for the UK and Australian markets. The 
Australian market additionally considers reactive power from synchronous 
condensers also as an ancillary service.  
On the other hand, deregulated markets in the Nordic countries do not 
have any provision for payments towards reactive power services. For 
example, in Sweden the responsibility for managing reactive power lies with 
network companies, with certain rules from the ISO, stipulating that there 
should be no exchange of reactive power over different network voltage 
levels and transformers. To meet these requirements, individual entities, 
such as local and regional networks, have to make provision for their own 
reactive power [20]. 
In a similar manner in the Netherlands, the network companies have to 
take care of their reactive power requirement individually. These companies 
however purchase reactive power locally through bilateral contracts with 
generators or through exchanges with other network companies. Those 
generators that have been contracted for the reactive power service are paid 
for their reactive power capacity only. No payment is made for reactive 
energy. 
Nevertheless, from the earlier discussions we see that there has been a 
move towards creating payment mechanisms for reactive power services in 
many systems. However, a fully competitive reactive power market has yet 
to emerge. Several issues make operating reactive power services within a 
competitive market framework very difficult. Some of them can be listed out 
as follows: 
• Reactive power services are required to be provided locally, and hence 
the ‘worth’ of one MVAr of reactive power is not the same everywhere 
in the system. Consequently, if a reactive power market is settled like a 
real power market, the ISO can end up contracting a set of low-priced 
offers, from such locations (buses) that are undesirable from system 
considerations. Therefore, reactive power markets need a new approach 
that takes into account both offer prices and location of the resource. 
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• As we have noted in [21], none of the deregulated electricity networks 
yet recognize reactive power from sources other than generators or 
synchronous condensors as "ancillary services." Changes at the policy 
level are necessary to include other reactive power sources such as 
capacitors, reactors, SVCs and FACTS devices etc., as ancillary services. 
This would enlarge the market and increase the competition, and 
inevitably increase the market efficiency and fairness. However, in this 
thesis we shall not consider such issues but only consider generators and 
synchronous condensers as reactive power ancillary service provider. 
• A long-term contract based reactive power market could prevent 
providers from exercising their market power and offering their reactive 
energy at higher prices than the cost of alternative reactive power 
generation [22]. 
We can therefore summarize that reactive power needs to be introduced in 
the ancillary service markets in a fair and equitable manner. Providers of 
reactive power support should be compensated for their services. However 
there are several complex issues involved in handling a reactive power 
service and in creating an efficient market for reactive power. In this chapter, 
we shall examine the various issues involved in reactive power management, 
as an ancillary service.  
2.2 SYNCHRONOUS GENERATORS AS REACTIVE POWER 
SERVICE PROVIDERS 
While reactive power ancillary services may be provided by many different 
parties such as generators, transmission / distribution companies, or even 
large customers, the importance of synchronous generators in providing the 
service remains a critical issue.  
In this section we examine the reactive power generation capability of a 
synchronous generator. The power output of a synchronous generator is 
usually limited to a value within the MVA rating by the capability of its 
prime mover. When real power and terminal voltage is fixed, its armature or 
field winding heating limits determine the reactive power generation from 
the generator. The armature heating limit is a circle (Refer to Figure 2.1) 
with radius R1=(VtIa)½ centred on the origin, given by equation (2.1), and the 
field heating limit is a circle, centred at C2, (0, -Vt2/XS) with radius 
R2=VtEaf/XS , given by equation (2.2) [23]. Vt is the voltage at the generator 
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terminal bus, Ia is the steady-state armature current, Eaf is the excitation 
voltage and XS is the synchronous reactance. P and Q are real and reactive 
power generation from the machine, respectively. 
 
Figure 2.1. Synchronous Generator Capability Curve 
( )2at22 IVQP ≤+  (2.1) 
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The machine rating is the point of intersection of the two circles ('R' in 
Figure 2.1). When P < PR, the limit on Q is imposed by the generator's field 
heating limit. While, when P > PR the armature heating limit imposes 
restrictions on Q. PR is the real power corresponding to machine rating 
power. 
To examine further into the generator’s reactive power supply, let us 
consider Figure 2.2. In Figure 2.2, Qbase is the reactive power required by the 
generator for its auxiliary equipment. If the operating point lies inside the 
limiting curves, say at (PA, Qbase), then the unit can increase its reactive 
generation from Qbase up to QA without requiring re-adjustment of PA. This 
will however, result in increased losses in the windings and hence increase 
the cost of loss. 
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Figure 2.2. Synchronous Generator Capability Curve 
If the generator is operating on the limiting curve, any increase in Q will 
require a decrease in P so as to adhere to the winding heating limits. 
Consider the operating point 'A' on the curve defined by (PA, QA). If more 
reactive power is required from the unit, say QB, the operating point requires 
shifting back along the curve to point B (PB, QB), where PB < PA. This 
signifies that the unit has to reduce its real power output to adhere to field 
heating limits when higher reactive power is demanded.  
Figure 2.2 also includes a lower limit on Q, which restricts the unit 
operation in under-excited mode due to localized heating in the end region 
of the armature. 
It is seen from Figure 2.2 that field and armature limits restrict reactive 
power provision and the fulfillment of contracted transactions. In all the 
three reactive power procurement models, to be discussed in this thesis, we 
consider synchronous generator capability curve as an important factor. 
2.3 PROPOSED STRUCTURE OF THE REACTIVE POWER 
MARKET 
To begin with, we define two terms that will be used for the development of 
the reactive power market. 
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(a) Expected Payment Function (EPF) - generators providing reactive 
power services incur various costs depending on their operating regime. 
While some of these costs are very difficult to differentiate from other costs, 
some are difficult to quantify. A comprehensive analysis of these costs has 
been provided in [24]. Under deregulation, a proper financial mechanism 
must exist for compensating these costs. The EPF is a mathematical 
formulation, to be developed subsequently, of cost components vis-à-vis the 
generator's expectation of payment for these components. 
(b) Cost of Loss - is one of the components of EPF. Reactive power 
supplied or absorbed by a generator increases the real power loss in field 
windings. The power thus lost, is a non-linear function of reactive power 
[25]. Although this component is much smaller compared to other losses in 
the system, it needs to be accounted for. This will be referred to as cost of 
loss. 
2.3.1 Cost of Reactive Power Production 
We have discussed in Section-2.2 the reactive power generation capability of 
synchronous generators. In Figure 2.2, assume that a unit is operating at (PA, 
Qbase). If the unit is required to increase its reactive power production from 
Qbase to QA, it will incur increased losses in the windings and hence increase 
in its costs. This cost is the cost of loss component and is incurred by the 
synchronous generator with reactive power production (both lagging and 
leading). A typical reactive power versus loss plot has been shown in [25]. 
For reactive power production higher than QA, the generator has to reduce 
its real power generation in order to meet the constraints imposed by field or 
armature heating limits. It will hence incur revenue loss (RL), which needs 
to be compensated net of its cost savings from reduced generation, expressed 
as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]BABA PCPCPPRL −−−= µ  (2.3) 
In (2.3), µ is the real power price and C(.) is the generation cost as a 
function of real power production. The term RL can also be called the 
opportunity cost component of reactive power generation for the generator. 
The above two components are explained in Figure 2.3. However, it is to 
be noted that the nature of the plot shown is only figurative to illustrate the 
two components i.e. the cost of loss plot need not necessarily be a parabolic 
curve nor the other component is necessarily parabolic. 
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Figure 2.3. Reactive power production versus increased costs incurred by a synchronous 
generator 
Understandably, the ISO will not be in a position to determine these two 
components for a generator since information on real power prices may not 
be known to the ISO if these are fixed through a bilateral contract, nor will 
the generator’s cost of loss function be known. 
An appropriate option in such a case is to call for reactive power offers 
from all generators. A possible structure of such reactive power offers, 
which the ISO should call for, from independent generators, is discussed in 
the next section. 
2.3.2 Structure of Reactive Power Offers from Generators 
As we have discussed in Section-2.3.1, the ISO would require calling for 
reactive power offers from generators and other participants in the reactive 
power market - depending on the market design. In this section we consider 
the possible reactive power offer structure of synchronous generators. 
We define three operating regions of a synchronous generator on the 
reactive power co-ordinate to formulate the generator's Expectation of 
Payment Function (EPF). An analysis and understanding of the EPF is 
desirable on the part of the ISO also, so as to retain control over the market 
and prevent unwarranted payments made due to an irrational bidding 
structure. 
The operating regions on the reactive co-ordinate can be defined as 
follows (Refer Figure 2.2): 
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Region-I: 0 to Qbase: Production in this region caters for the reactive power 
needed by the generator to maintain its own equipment. This includes 
reactive consumption by unit’s auxiliaries (such as boiler feed pump motors, 
circulating water system pump motors, induced draft fan motors, forced 
draft fan motors, step-up transformers, etc.). Therefore any reactive power 
generated in this region does not qualify as an ancillary service. 
The generator should not be entitled to receive any payment 
for reactive power production in Region-I. 
EPF = 0 
However, it may be very difficult for the ISO to determine Qbase, unless 
the generator reports this parameter correctly, which may be unlikely, given 
the competitive market environment. One way to go about this, is to pre-
calculate the technical requirements based on machine and equipment 
ratings and decide on certain standard Qbase, which does not qualify for 
payment. For example, setting a qualifying limit of 0.95 lagging power 
factor may be one of the ways. 
Region-II: (Qbase to QA) and (0 to QMin): This region denotes that amount 
of reactive power, which the generator can provide or absorb, without 
having to reschedule its real power generation. However, as mentioned 
earlier, this will increase the generator’s real power losses in the windings. 
These losses increase with the amount of reactive power generated or 
absorbed. Therefore, the generator will expect to be paid for the cost of 
losses (probably at the prevailing spot-market rates) and also for making 
available its service. 
This payment structure is very difficult to formulate because of the 
complexity involved in determining the availability payment. Probably this 
can be found by the ISO by determining the cost to the system due to its 
unavailability - the opportunity cost of not having the service of the 
generator. Also, determining the cost of loss can be difficult due to the 
variation of system prices and machine parameters. 
The generator is entitled to receive 2 components of payments in Region-II 
EPF = Availability component + Cost of Loss Component  
 
Region-III: QA to QB: This region denotes that amount of reactive power 
which a generator is willing to produce, at the cost of having to reduce its 
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own real power generation. The generator stands to lose revenue from the 
unfulfilled real power selling contracts. The financial compensation that the 
generator expects from its reactive power service is the revenue lost due to 
its scheduled real power sell, given by (2.3). 
The generator is entitled to receive payment commensurate with its 
opportunity cost of reduced real power production 
EPF = Availability Cost + Cost of Loss +Opportunity Cost  
However, the ISO will not be in a position to estimate the EPF for a 
generator in deregulated markets. An appropriate option for the ISO is to call 
for reactive power offers from all generators based on the EPF structure. A 
possible structure of such reactive offers is discussed as following. 
Based on the classification of reactive power production costs, a 
generalized EPF and hence an offer structure can be formulated 
mathematically. 
( )∫∫∫ ⋅⋅+⋅+⋅+= B
A
A
baseMin
Q
Q
iii3
Q
Q
ii2
0
Q
ii1i,oi dQQmdQmdQmaEPF  (2.4)  
The coefficients in (2.4) represent the various components of reactive 
power cost incurred by provider i that need to be offered in the market. 
These are explained as follows: 
ao: Availability price offer, in $ 
m1: Cost of loss price offer for operating in under-excited mode 
(absorb reactive power), QMin ≤ Q ≤0, $/MVArh 
m2: Cost of loss price offer for operating in the region  
QBase ≤ Q≤QA, $/MVArh 
m3Q: Opportunity price offer for operating in the region QA≤Q≤QB, 
($/MVArh)/MVArh. Note that the opportunity price offer is a 
function of reactive power output and hence the corresponding 
EPF component will be a quadratic function of Q. 
The generalized EPF vis-à-vis the offer parameters, discussed above, are 
shown in Figure 2.4. Note that the above discussions also hold for 
synchronous condensers, except the opportunity cost component. 
Synchronous condensers will be assumed to offer all components, except the 
opportunity price. 
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Figure 2.4. Structure of Reactive Power Offers from Providers 
We should note here that the 'availability' offer typically represents a part 
of the generator's capital cost that goes towards providing reactive power. 
This is annualized and further reduced on a day's scale. Understandably, this 
is very difficult to separate from the total capital cost, but in any case, is a 
small fraction only. The ‘cost of loss offer’ represents the generator's 
operational costs in providing the service. These two components are 
therefore not very different in magnitude, both being of similar orders in the 
model. 
2.4 OPTIMAL PROCUREMENT OF REACTIVE POWER 
SERVICES 
With a reactive power offer structure established in Section-2.3, the ISO 
requires a proper criterion to determine the best offers and thus formulate its 
reactive power procurement plan. Unlike real power markets where bids are 
selected in ascending order of prices, reactive power markets need to 
consider the location aspects also because of the transmission loss 
considerations.  
For example, a low priced reactive power offer at a bus remotely located 
is not necessarily an attractive option for the ISO. On the other hand, even a 
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somewhat expensive reactive power offer at a heavily loaded demand center 
could well be considered for procurement.  
We consider the ISO’s problem of obtaining optimal reactive power 
contracts, assuming that the reactive power providers offer their prices to the 
ISO rationally. 
The reactive power providers can enter into either long or short-term 
contracts with the ISO for reactive power provision. Contracted provisions 
involve payments to be made by the ISO, and it remains an objective of the 
ISO to procure the service so as to minimize the total payment while 
meeting the system constraints. Although this is a seemingly fair enough 
objective, such an optimal selection can result in increased losses in the 
system or may require curtailment of real power transaction contracts, both 
of which are undesirable. Increased energy loss requires the ISO to increase 
its procurement of loss compensation services from balance providers 
(generators or loads) involving additional payments. Thus, a minimum 
payment objective may not necessarily satisfy all the concerns of the ISO. 
A two-step method is proposed in this chapter to address the problem of 
optimal reactive power procurement considering both technical and financial 
efficiency of the ISO. The method can be summarized as follows: 
Step-I: The ISO determines the marginal benefit to the system from each 
reactive power offer with respect to system losses. 
Step-II: Having obtained the marginal benefit from each reactive power 
offer, the ISO seeks to maximize a societal advantage function 
(SAF). 
2.4.1 Marginal Benefit from a Reactive Power Service 
The marginal benefit to the system from one unit of reactive power support 
at a bus can be determined from the dual of the system constraints of an 
appropriate OPF model representing the grid. Consider the following 
modified OPF: 
Minimize: System transmission losses, 
Loss = ( )( )( )∑ −−+×
j,i
ijji
2
j
2
ij,i cosVV2VVG5.0 δδ  (2.5) 
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Subject to the following constraints: 
Load flow equations: 
∑∑ −+=−
j
ijijijji
gen
gen,i
con
i )cos(YVVXPPG δδθ  (2.6) 
∑ −+−=−
j
ijijijjiii )sin(YVVQDQ δδθ  (2.7) 
Bus voltage limits: 
iii VVV ≤≤  (2.8) 
Limit on bilateral transactions: 
con
gen,igen,i XPXP0 ≤≤  (2.9) 
con
gen,iXP  is the contracted real power transaction by a load at bus i with a 
generator gen. The bilateral transactions are modeled using the method 
discussed in Appendix-A. 
Reactive power capability limit of generators: 
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Equation (2.10) is applicable when the field heating limit acts as the upper 
limit (i.e. for PA<PR) and (2.11) when the armature heating limit is 
applicable (i.e. for PA>PR). 
Lower limits on reactive power generation: 
As mentioned in Section-2.2, the under-excitation limit, QMin, is fixed 
apriori and hence the lower limit of reactive power generation is governed 
by the constraint, 
ii,Min QQ ≤  (2.12) 
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For the modified OPF described by equations ((2.5) to (2.12)), we define 
three sets of Lagrange multipliers, λ, γ, µ,  associated with the three reactive 
power constraints (2.7),(2.10),(2.12) to derive important conclusions. 
2.4.1.1 Dual of the nodal reactive power balance constraint: λ 
The dual of the nodal reactive power balance equation (2.7) denotes the 
sensitivity of the system loss parameter to change in reactive power injection 
at a bus. 
λ is in unit of MW/MVAr denoting the change in MW loss per MVAr 
change in reactive power injection. When λ is multiplied with a cost 
parameter CL (in $/MW) denoting the economic worth of reduced loss, the 
marginal benefit (MB), to the ISO from reactive power injection at a bus is 
obtained.  
$/MVAr in     Lii CMB ⋅= λ  (2.13) 
2.4.1.2 Dual of the generator reactive power capability constraint: γ 
When the generator is operating at its reactive power capability limits, it is 
of interest to know how the system will benefit if the generator increases its 
reactive power output by backing down real power generation. The dual of 
constraints (2.10) and (2.11), while minimizing the system loss, provides 
important insight on these lines. 
Thus, γgen indicates by how much the system loss will change for a unit 
change in generator reactive power capability. A value of γ = 0 indicates that 
the reactive power generation is below the limit specified by field or 
armature current limits (i.e. referring to Figure 2.2, if P = PA, Q < QA). If γ < 
0, it indicates that the system losses will reduce if reactive power generation 
is increased (i.e., Q>QA) by reducing real power generation. If γ > 0, it 
indicates that the system losses will increase if reactive power generation is 
increased beyond the limit. In such a case, it is not desirable to generate 
additional reactive power by reducing real power output. 
The marginal benefit to the ISO from a generator supplying reactive 
power at its field or armature winding heating limit is given by, 
$/MVAr  in     Lgengen CMB ⋅= γ  (2.14) 
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2.4.1.3 Dual of the under excitation constraint on reactive power 
generation: µ 
This parameter is the dual associated with the under-excitation constraint 
(2.12) which determines the lower limit of reactive power generation. 
Therefore, 
$/MVAr in      Lii CMB ⋅= µ  (2.15) 
2.4.2 Optimal Reactive Power Procurement 
2.4.2.1 Societal Advantage Function of the ISO 
Marginal benefit of reactive power support at each bus, and bid parameters 
m2 and m3 for each reactive power provider, are now available to the ISO. 
Here, we suppose a0=0, m1=0 and Qbase=0. Then, we can define the 
composite Societal Advantage Function (SAF) for the ISO as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( )∑∑  −⋅−⋅−⋅+⋅−⋅= gen 2Agen3gen3gen3gen2genLgen gen2gen2genL QQm21QmCQmCSAF γλ
 (2.16) 
In (2.16), Q2 and Q3 represent the reactive power in regions II and III 
mentioned in Section- 2.3.2, respectively. The societal advantage function 
desired in (2.16) represents from the ISO’s viewpoint. The net “welfare” to 
the system in terms of loss reduction is due to reactive power injection at a 
bus, while taking into account the gross benefits from that injection and their 
associated prices. 
2.4.2.2 SAF Maximization 
Once the ISO’s composite advantage function is constructed as in (2.16), the 
reactive power procurement plan can be obtained from a second stage 
optimization model constructed using the information now available. 
Maximize: the Societal Advantage Function given by (2.16). 
Subject to the following constraints: 
• Load Flow Equations ((2.6),(2.7)) 
• Bus Voltage Limits (2.8) 
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• Limit on Bilateral Transaction (2.9) 
• Reactive power generation limits: 
In Section-2.4.1 we considered that the upper limit on reactive power is 
constrained by the field or armature heating limits. Now we consider that the 
generator is willing to reduce its real power output from PA to PB (refer 
Figure 2.2) in order to provide higher reactive power (for a price). The 
constraint (2.17) states that the maximum reactive power support available 
from a generator is QB for an operating point, PA. 
i,Bii,Min QQQ ≤≤  (2.17) 
• Reactive power generation relational constraints: 
According to the regions on the reactive power domain, discussed in 
Section-2.3.2, the reactive power output Q from a generator can be classified 
in any of the three components: Q1, Q2 or Q3, to represent region (Qmin, Qbase), 
(Qbase, QA) or (QA, QB), respectively. The governing algebraic relations 
between them can be written as follows. 
iii 321i QQQQ ++=  (2.18) 
iBi33Aii3
Aii22iBasei2
iBasei11imini1
QWQQW
QWQQW
QWQQW
i
i
i
⋅≤≤⋅
⋅≤≤⋅
⋅≤≤⋅
 (2.19) 
1321 ≤++ iii WWW  (2.20) 
W1, W2 and W3 are binary variables for the discrete selection of a reactive 
power component from any of the three regions. According to (2.20) only 
one of the binary variables can be selected. This automatically restricts that 
Q can be in only one of the bidding regions shown in Figure 2.4. 
2.5 SIMULATIONS ON CIGRÉ 32-BUS SYSTEM: RESULTS 
AND DISCUSSIONS 
The Cigré 32-bus test system described in Appendix-A and shown in Figure 
A.1, is used in this chapter to evaluate the optimal reactive power 
procurement plan for the ISO. The bilateral contract transactions between 
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suppliers and consumers are obtained using the method described in 
Appendix-B. Bus 4011 is selected as slack bus to balance the deviation from 
transactions and provide for system losses. 
2.5.1 Step-I: Obtain Marginal Benefit from Reactive Power 
Support at a Bus 
The marginal benefit to the system from reactive power support at a bus is 
obtained by solving the modified OPF model discussed in Section-2.4.1. 
This model is a non-linear programming problem and is solved using the 
high-level programming platform General Algebraic Modeling System 
(GAMS) and non-linear programming solver MINOS-5 [26]. 
λ, γ, and µ associated with each generator’s reactive power constraints 
have been listed in Table 2.2. The corresponding marginal benefits are 
determined from λ, γ and µ and (2.13)-(2.15), assuming CL=$100/MW. The 
reactive power offers, m2 and m3, from all generators are also listed in Table 
2.2. 
The optimum reactive power support, Q, which evolves from the model 
solution, is also shown. Either the field or the armature winding heating limit, 
according to the operating condition, specifies the upper limit QMax while the 
lower limit QMin is fixed apriori. Accordingly, either γ or µ assumes a non-
zero value if Q touches the upper or lower limit respectively. The 
corresponding λ is equal and negative in sign. The Lagrange multipliers are 
zero if Q lies between the range of QMax and QMin. Therefore, the reactive 
power support plan, which evolves in Table 2.2 adheres to the field or 
armature heating limits, as appropriate. 
The ISO achieves a minimum transmission loss of 3.67 p.u.MW with the 
above reactive power procurement plan. However, if the associated offer 
prices of respective reactive power support are accounted for, we see that the 
ISO ends up with a very high and negative societal advantage value of minus 
$862.0/hr from the above plan. This is not desirable from the ISO’s 
viewpoint in deregulated electricity markets. 
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Table 2.2. Marginal values and optimal reactive power scheme 
Bus λ γ µ m2 m3 Q QMax QMin 
4072 0 0 0 1.25 0.06 4.67 12.78 -7.5 
4071 0.0014 -0.0014 0 0.1 0.07 1.12 1.12 -0.84 
4011 0 0 0 0.24 0.09 -1.46 2.52 -1.67 
4012 0 0 0 0.67 0.04 -1.24 2.19 -1.33 
4021 -0.0776 0 0.0776 0.72 0.07 -0.5 0.82 -0.5 
4031 0 0 0 0.61 0.05 -0.08 0.98 -0.59 
4042 -0.02 0 0.02 1.7 0.07 0 2.95 0 
4062 -0.005 0 0.005 0.4 0.05 0 1.33 0 
4063 0 0 0 0.86 0.05 1.84 5.44 0 
4051 0 0 0 0.37 0.09 0.53 2.83 0 
4047 -0.0112 0 0.0112 0.75 0.05 0 2.5 0 
2032 0 0 0 0.89 0.02 1.26 2.12 -1.42 
1013 0 0 0 0.63 0.06 0.66 1.25 -1.0 
1012 0.0011 -0.0011 0 0.92 0.03 1.85 1.85 -1.33 
1014 0 0 0 0.20 0.05 0.36 2.01 -1.17 
1022 0.013 -0.013 0 1.58 0.04 0.61 0.61 -0.67 
1021 0 0 0 0.32 0.04 -0.23 1.71 -1.0 
1043 -0.014 0 0.014 0.68 0.05 0 0.87 0 
Total System Losses 3.67 p.u. MW 
Societal Advantage - $ 862.00/hr 
λ, γ and µ are in MW/MVAr; m2 is in $/MVAr, m3 in $/MVAr/MVAr,  
Q, QMax and QMin are in p.u. MVAr units. We assume: QBase = 0 
2.5.2 Step-II: Final Optimization 
The second stage of optimization therefore seeks to find a compromise 
between the technically best and a financially safe solution for the ISO. 
Marginal benefits obtained from the first step and the offered prices are used 
in the final optimization that seeks to maximize the societal advantage 
function (2.16). This problem (stated in Section-2.4.2) is a mixed-integer 
non-linear programming problem and is solved using the GAMS/DICOPT 
solver. GAMS/MINOS5 and GAMS/XA are invoked by DICOPT as the 
non-linear programming and integer programming solvers respectively. 
The optimal reactive power procurement plan obtained after the second 
step is listed in Table 2.3. Note that now the reactive power plan at certain 
buses exceeds QMax (at buses 4071, 4062, 1012 and 1022). These generators 
will require reducing their real power output to provide the additional 
reactive power, and will be compensated as per the offer prices. When Q 
falls in region-III (ref. Section-2.3.2), we desegregate Q in two components, 
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Q2 and Q’3. Q2 denotes how much it provides within the reactive limits, and 
Q’3 shows how much it provides above its reactive limits (by reducing real 
output). 
Table 2.3. Reactive power procurement plan after final optimization 
Bus Q QMax Q1 Q2 Q’3 
4072 1.97 12.78 - 1.97 - 
4071 1.68 1.12 - 1.12 0.56 
4012 -0.49 2.19 -0.49 - - 
4021 -0.5 0.82 -0.5 - - 
4062 2.0 1.33 - 1.33 0.67 
1013 1.25 0.66 - 1.25 - 
1012 2.78 1.85 - 1.85 0.93 
1022 0.91 0.61 - 0.61 0.3 
1021 -0.25 1.71 -0.25 - - 
Total System Loss 4.67 p.u. MW 
Societal Advantage $ 108.00/hr 
From Table 2.3, we can see that the solution yields a positive and fairly 
high societal advantage for the ISO ($108.0/hr). As expected, the system 
bears a higher transmission loss (4.67 p.u.MW) from this reactive power 
procurement plan, but this plan is financially safe for the ISO. 
2.5.3 Uncertainty in Reactive Power Demand and Offer Prices 
The solution obtained in Section-2.5.2 that demonstrates the optimal 
procurement scheme assumes a particular load condition and a set of 
reactive power offer prices. Understandably, the solution obtained is a 
biased solution depending on the nature of input information. 
Monte Carlo simulation is used now to model the uncertainty associated 
with the demand and bid prices. If the distribution form of uncertain 
parameters is known, the expected behavior of the system can be studied by 
averaging the outcomes of different simulation cases. Among the advantages 
of Monte Carlo simulation is its conceptual simplicity i.e., each simulation 
exercise (or sampling) can be viewed as a possible state of system operation. 
The reactive power demand and offer prices have been assigned a range 
of variation, with a normal distribution for the former and a uniform 
distribution for the later. Simulations are carried out over the range of 
uncertainties and the expected outcome is evaluated by averaging over the 
entire simulation samples. 
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2.5.3.1 Uncertainty in Reactive Power Demand, QD 
A normal distribution is considered for simulating the reactive power 
demand uncertainty. Offer prices are held at their nominal values during this 
case. The optimal solution is obtained for each Monte Carlo simulation 
sample using the two-step approach discussed earlier. 
The expected reactive power procurement plan is given in Table 2.4 while 
Figure 2.5 shows the solution convergence to the expected value with 
increasing sample size of Monte Carlo simulation. For example, the reactive 
power procurement at bus ‘4072’ converges to 0.49 p.u.MVAr in a Monte 
Carlo simulation with 200 samples. 
The expected reactive power procurement plan in Table 2.4 is somewhat 
different from the single simulation solution shown in Table 2.3. The 
expected system loss is less and the expected societal advantage is more than 
that obtained from the single simulation case. This indicates that the single 
simulation case was a typically high reactive power demand case simulated. 
Over a range of reactive power demand, the solution converges around the 
expectation values, shown in Table 2.4. 
Table 2.4. Optimal solution with uncertainty in reactive demand 
Bus Q Q1 Q2 Q’3 
4072 0.49 - 0.49 - 
4071 1.60 - 1.12 0.48 
4011 0.01 - 0.01 - 
4012 -0.88 -0.88 - - 
4021 -0.46 -0.46 - - 
4031 -0.09 -0.09 - - 
4062 0.75 - 0.75 - 
2032 0.03 - 0.03 - 
1013 0.94 - 0.94 - 
1012 2.63 - 1.85 0.78 
1014 0.05 - 0.05 - 
1022 0.67 - 0.61 0.06 
1021 -0.29 -0.29 - - 
1043 0.01 - 0.01 - 
Total System Loss 4.52 p.u. MW 
Societal Advantage $ 179.00/hr 
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Figure 2.5. Expected Reactive Power Procurement of Bus 4072 with Uncertain Reactive 
Power Demand 
2.5.3.2 Uncertainty in offer price parameters, m2 and m3 
The uncertainties in m2 and m3 are assumed to be uniformly distributed over 
a range. The optimal solution given in Table 2.5 and Figure 2.6 shows the 
convergence to the expected values with increasing sample size of Monte 
Carlo simulation. Reactive power procurement at bus ‘4072’ converges to 
0.29 p.u.MVAr with a sample size of 400. 
Table 2.5. Optimal solution with uncertainty in bid price 
Bus Q Q1 Q2 Q’3 
4072 0.29 - 0.29 - 
4071 1.68 - 1.12 0.56 
4011 0.01 - 0.01 - 
4012 -0.97 -0.97 - - 
4021 -0.48 -0.48 - - 
4031 -0.02 -0.02 - - 
4062 0.28 - 0.28 - 
1013 1.08 - 1.08 - 
1012 2.78 - 1.85 0.93 
1014 0.05 - 0.05 - 
1022 0.91 - 0.61 0.3 
1021 -0.27 -0.27 - - 
Total System Loss 4.65 p.u. MW 
Societal Advantage $ 101.00 
 
The expected reactive power procurement plan in Table 2.5 is again 
somewhat different from the single sample solution of Table 2.3. The large 
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sample size with Monte Carlo simulations smoothens the otherwise biased 
single input and introduces fairness in the solution. 
 
Figure 2.6. Expected Reactive Power on Bus 4072 with Uncertain Bid Prices 
2.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS  
Procurement of various ancillary services is a complex task for the ISO in 
deregulated electricity markets. Among various factors that need to be 
considered, are the benefit to the system from a particular service in terms of 
system security, economics and reliability, and the cost of the service in 
terms of payments to be made to the service providers.  
Provision for reactive power support and devising appropriate pricing 
mechanisms for that is an important issue. In this chapter an offer price 
structure for reactive power ancillary service has been developed. Reactive 
power capability characteristic of a synchronous generator has been 
analyzed in detail to formulate an Expected Payment Function based on the 
cost of reactive power production. 
We have further discussed the procurement of reactive power services 
based on the proposed market structure. The marginal benefit to the system 
from reactive power support at a bus is evaluated using the dual of the 
reactive power constraints. It is seen that the ISO tends to procure reactive 
power services from those providers that provide the best societal advantage, 
i.e., have high marginal benefit from the service while having price offers 
within acceptable ranges.  
It has also been clearly demonstrated that if the ISO uses the classical loss 
minimization objective function for procurement of reactive power services, 
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it would end up with a high burden of payments. The classical objective is 
thus not the best suited one, while the new objective function, referred to, in 
this chapter, as the societal advantage function, does clearly provide the ISO 
with an optimal procurement plan for reactive power services. 
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CHAPTER 3  
TOWARD A COMPETITIVE MARKET FOR 
REACTIVE POWER* 
In Chapter-2, an approach to optimal contracting of reactive power services by 
the ISO was presented, using the maximization of a societal advantage 
function. This chapter extends the issue further to the creation of a competitive 
market for reactive power services and determining a possible model for 
market settlement and obtaining 'uniform' reactive power prices for all 
providers.  
Through conventional load-flow analysis, market players (i.e., reactive 
power providers) can determine those buses that consistently require high 
reactive power support. A provider located at such a bus would have 
significant opportunities to indulge in gaming, given the limited number of 
potential players in the system. To prevent this- 
• If a uniform price auction is used to determine the reactive power market 
prices, the providers will have incentives to offer their true operating and 
opportunity cost. Since each provider receives a price greater than its offer 
price in uniform auction, submitting an offer priced above its costs will 
expose the provider to the risk that the offer is not selected, with a resulting 
loss of revenue. Thus providers will have a clear incentive not to indulge in 
gaming but offer prices equal to their costs and quantities equal to their 
capacity [27]. 
• It can be argued that nodal reactive power pricing methods would motivate 
new reactive power investments in high demand areas and thereby reduce 
market power concerns. However, as discussed in [22], such pricing 
instruments only represent a portion of the true cost of the reactive power 
service- that associated with fuel cost of real power. The capital and 
opportunity cost components of reactive power is not be accounted for. 
                                                          
* Some parts of this chapter has been published in the following paper: 
• J. Zhong and K. Bhattacharya, “Toward a competitive market for reactive power,” IEEE 
Transactions on Power Systems, Vol.17, No.4, November 2002, pp.1206-1215. 
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Moreover, with the high volatility of nodal prices, such a pricing could 
lead to highly unstable reactive power markets. 
The design of a reactive power market is thus an important issue, and 
possibilities for gaming and market power need to be eliminated so that the 
market functions efficiently. In this chapter, we analyze the barriers to the 
creation of such a competitive market - those existing in the form of 'market 
power' with certain service providers. When such barriers are identified, the 
ISO can take corrective steps to remove them and improve the efficiency of 
the reactive power market.  
3.1 MARKET SETTLEMENT AND PRICE FORMATION 
The following assumptions are made regarding the design of a reactive power 
market. 
• The ISO or a similar entity operates this market and is the sole contractor 
of reactive power services with providers. Thus the market is 
monopsonistic in structure. The ISO calls for reactive power offers from 
the providers. 
• The market operates on long-term contracts so that short-term demand 
fluctuations, reserve conditions, or real power market price spikes do not 
affect reactive power offer price trends. The market is further assumed to 
be fairly perfect with rational participants [22]. 
• The market is settled on first price, uniform auction, which meaning that 
all selected providers receive a uniform price, which is the highest priced 
offer accepted. As discussed in [27] and in [28], this provides the players 
enough incentives to submit offer prices equal to their true costs. 
All participating providers submit their offers to the ISO in terms of the 
four components, as discussed in Section-2.3.2. As mentioned earlier, the 
opportunity price offer for synchronous condensers is ‘zero’. Once these price 
offers are received, the ISO settles the market and declares the uniform market 
price for each component separately. 
We know that in real-power markets, the offers are stacked in increasing 
order of prices and that offer intersecting the demand curve determines the 
market price. However, with reactive power offers, location being an 
important issue, a low priced offer need not necessarily be attractive if the 
provider is located at a remote bus. Similarly, an expensive offer, from a 
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provider at a heavily loaded demand center may be unavoidable and need to 
be procured. 
Therefore settlement of a reactive power market must consider the system 
configuration and operating conditions in addition to offer prices. While on 
one hand, reactive power services should seek to minimize the system losses, 
they should not result in a high payment burden for the ISO. Further, the 
procured services should also ensure that contracted real power transactions 
are met and curtailments are kept at a minimum. The ISO is thus faced with a 
conflicting situation where it has to contract reactive power services to ensure 
that losses, curtailments and payments, are all within tolerable limits. 
To achieve this, a compromise programming approach is proposed here to 
settle the market and determine the uniform prices, incorporating the 
following considerations: 
• The reactive power market is settled such that the total payment made by 
the ISO to procure the services, is minimized. 
• The ISO aims to satisfy all contracted real power trades between suppliers 
and customers. 
• The transmission losses are minimized. 
Four steps are necessary to arrive at the compromise solution and hence the 
market settlement, which are discussed in the following sub-section. 
3.1.1 Market Settlement to Minimize Payment 
This sub-section describes reactive power market settlement with total 
payment (JP) (3.1) as the objective for minimization. The total payment shall 
depend on the market price of the four components of reactive power service, 
being offered by the providers. 
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i,3i,33i,Ai,32
gen
i,2i,22i,1i,11i,00P
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ρρ
ρρρ
 (3.1) 
Reactive power output from a provider is classified into three components: 
Q1, Q2 or Q3, to represent the regions (Qmin, 0), (Qbase, QA) and (QA, QB), 
respectively. Accordingly, only one of the binary variables W1, W2 and W3 
can be selected. In (3.1), ρo is the uniform availability price, ρ1 and ρ2 are the 
uniform cost of loss prices while ρ3 is the uniform opportunity price. If a 
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provider is selected, Wo will be 1 and it will receive the availability price 
irrespective of its reactive power output. The system constraints are as follows: 
Load Flow Equations: 
∑∑ −+=−
j
ijijijji
gen
gen,i
con
i )cos(YVVXPPG δδθ  (3.2) 
∑ −+−=+−
j
ijijijjiiii )sin(YVVQCQDQ δδθ  (3.3) 
Reactive Power Relational Constraints and Limits: 
As per the reactive power offer regions, discussed in Section-2.3.2, a set of 
governing algebraic relations are required to ensure appropriate allocation. 
These can be written as follows. 
i3i2i1i QQQQ ++=  (3.4) 
 
iBi3i,3i,Ai3
Aii2i2i,basei2
i,basei1i1i,Mini1
QWQQW
QWQQW
QWQQW
⋅≤≤⋅
⋅≤≤⋅
⋅≤≤⋅
 (3.5) 
 
1WWW i,3i,2i,1 ≤++  (3.6) 
Determining the Market Prices: 
The market prices are determined separately for each component of reactive 
power. The following constraints ensure that the market price, for a given set 
of offers, is the highest priced offer accepted. 
oi,oi,0 aW ρ≤⋅  (3.7) 
1i,1i,1 mW ρ≤⋅  (3.8) ( ) 2i,2i,3i,2 mWW ρ≤⋅+  (3.9) 
3i,3i,3 mW ρ≤⋅  (3.10) 
geniWWWW i,3i,2i,1i,0 ∈∀++=  (3.11) 
Reactive Power Generation Limits: 
i,Bii,Min QQQ ≤≤  (3.12) 
imax,ii,Min QCQCQC ≤≤  (3.13) 
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In (3.12), the upper limit on reactive power output from a generator is QB 
(refer Figure 2.2) which takes into account the opportunity component. QC in 
(3.13) is the reactive power support from other reactive sources, e.g., capacitor 
banks. These are not included in the market since these are not considered 
ancillary services. 
Bus Voltage Limits 
bus PVi  constant
bus loadi
∈∀=
∈∀≤≤
i
Max
ii
Min
i
V
VVV
 (3.14) 
Limit on Bilateral Transactions: 
This constraint ensures that all bilateral transactions are within pre-specified 
limits. The bilateral transactions are modeled using the method discussed in 
Appendix-A. 
con
gen,igen,i XPXP0 ≤≤  (3.15) 
con
gen,iXP  is the contracted real power transaction by a load at bus i with 
generator gen. XPi,gen is the decision variable and denotes the actual 
transaction allowed by ISO. 
3.1.2 Market Settlement to Minimize Transmission Losses 
This model describes the procurement of reactive power services to minimize 
transmission losses (JL) (3.16) and is similar to a classical reactive power 
optimization problem. Market prices are determined ex post. That means, after 
the optimal solution is obtained, the highest priced offer selected determines 
the uniform price. The model is described below. 
( )( )( )∑ −−+××=
j,i
ijji
2
j
2
ij,iL cosVV2VVG5.0J θθ  (3.16) 
The constraints are as follows: 
• Load Flow Equations (3.2), (3.3) 
• Reactive power generation limits (3.12), (3.13) 
• Bus Voltage Limits (3.14) 
• Limit on Bilateral Transactions (3.15) 
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3.1.3 Market Settlement to Minimize Deviation from Contracted 
Transactions 
This model ensures that the procured reactive power contracts minimize 
deviations from contracted transactions (JD). This therefore also ensures that 
curtailment of power transactions is minimized. As in the case of minimizing 
transmission losses, the market prices are determined ex post. The model is 
described below. JD represents the difference between contracted transactions 
(between generators and loads) and actual transactions permitted by the ISO. 
( )∑ −=
gen,i
gen,i
con
gen,iD XPXPJ  (3.17) 
The constraints are as follows: 
• Load Flow Equations (3.2), (3.3) 
• Reactive Power Generation Limits (3.12), (3.13) 
• Bus Voltage Limits (3.14) 
• Limit on Bilateral Transactions (3.15) 
3.1.4 Market Settlement to Minimize the Compromise Function 
It is seen that the reactive power market can be based on different objective 
functions for the ISO. For example, in the previous sub-sections we have 
formulated markets that  
1) seek to achieve the minimum market price- consumer payment 
minimization  
2) minimize losses  
3) minimize deviations from contracted transactions 
While each model independently seeks important targets, an ISO would 
often desire to achieve all the three targets simultaneously. To achieve that, 
we propose a 'compromise programming' model that attains the 'best 
compromise' among the conflicting objectives [29], [30]. The three objectives 
can be combined into a 'compromise function' (3.18), which when minimized, 
will represent the ISO’s requirement of meeting contradictory objectives 
simultaneously. 
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JP*, JL* and JD* are the respective minimum values when JP, JL and JD are 
optimized independently. Note that while we have used an equal weight for 
each conflicting component in (3.18), this need not necessarily be the case in 
actual markets. The ISO may choose to have a priority on the objectives, 
depending on the market condition. For example, if the participants are willing 
to pay for increased losses in order to have their transactions fulfilled, the 
weight on JL could be very small. Thus, the choice of weights to be associated 
with the three components of (3.18) should be made by the ISO, as per its 
decision-making criteria. In this chapter, we consider equal weights of unity 
for the three components. 
The constraints associated with the compromise optimization are same as 
that for payment minimization, and are listed below. 
• Load Flow Equations (3.2), (3.3) 
• Reactive Power Relational Constraints & Limits (3.4)-- (3.6) 
• Determining Uniform Market Prices (3.7) -- (3.11) 
• Reactive Power Generation Limits (3.12), (3.13) 
• Bus Voltage Limits (3.14) 
• Limit on Bilateral Transactions (3.15) 
Finally, the working scheme of the proposed reactive power market is 
shown in Figure 3.1. 
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generator Syn comp
Obtain market price ρo, ρ1 , ρ2 and ρ3,
and reactive power contracts
……
Minimize
contracted deviation
Compromise
generator ……
Offer for ao, m1, m2 and m3
 
Figure 3.1. Working Scheme of the Proposed Reactive Power Market 
3.2 CASE STUDY AND SCENARIO ANALYSES 
The same Cigré 32-bus test system used in Chapter-2 (refer Appendix-A), is 
used to examine the proposed market settlement and contracting scheme. 
Though this system was initially established for stability studies, we have used 
the network configuration and base-case load flow data provided, and adopted 
a steady-state model for our present research.  
In order to carry out the analysis, the ISO needs the following information 
from the reactive power providers: 
• Offer prices: for four components- ao, m1, m2, and m3. In real operation, the 
ISO will receive this information directly from providers. For our analysis 
we use a uniform random number generator to simulate the offer prices. 
• Reactive capability: The providers are required to make available 
information on QBase, QA and QB (ref. Fig. 1). For our analysis, we assume 
QBase = 0.10*QMax, QA is limited either by the field or the armature heating 
limit, as per operating condition, and QB = 1.5*QA is assumed. 
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3.2.1 Simulation Results and Discussions 
3.2.1.1 Base Case: Optimal Contracts and Market Settlement 
In the base case, we assume that all bus loading are at their nominal levels, the 
providers are rational participants in the reactive power market and offer their 
true expected payment function. The bus-wise offer prices from all providers 
are given in Table 3.1. 
As mentioned earlier, each provider offers four components, the availability 
offer ao, the cost of loss offer m1 and m2, and opportunity offer m3. Note that a 
synchronous condenser is located at bus “4041” and its opportunity price offer 
is zero. Based on submitted offers, the market settlement scheme is run as 
discussed in Section-3.1. The optimal reactive power contracts, obtained from 
each step, and the final compromise solution, are provided in Table 3.1. The 
following observations are made from the results in Table 3.1. 
a. Based on the comprise solution, the ISO contracts the following providers- 
generator at buses: “4072”, “4011”, “4012”, “4062”, “1013”, “1012” and 
“1022”. 
b. Amongst the contracted generators, “4011”, “1013” and “1022” are also 
contracted for their opportunity component. 
c. Market prices are determined by the highest offer in each category from 
selected providers. Thus, we get ρo=$0.96, ρ2=$0.90/MVArh and 
ρ3=$0.25/MVArh, and generators “4072”, “4062” and “4011” are the 
corresponding price-setters. The under-excited operation market price is 
zero, i.e., ρ1=0, since no offer is selected from this category. 
It can be seen from Table 3.1 that, if the ISO minimizes losses or 
transaction deviations only, it would need to contract almost all the offers in 
the market, and a significant number of them for the opportunity component. 
Though losses or deviations would be low, its financial burden would be very 
high. When the ISO seeks to minimize total payment only, it contracts for 
much less reactive power support while bearing a burden of increased losses 
and transaction deviations. 
In the compromise solution, the total reactive power contracted, and the 
number of contracted parties, is kept at a fairly rational level without 
jeopardizing the system loss or transaction deviation standards. The total 
payment, losses and deviations achieved from the compromise optimization 
are fairly close to that obtained when these are individually minimized. The 
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uniform prices achieved for each component, in the compromise solution, are 
also close to the lowest value achievable from the individual minimization. 
Table 3.1. Reactive power offers and optimal contracts in base case 
 Reactive Contracts in p.u.MVAr 
Bus Offer Prices (ao, m1, m2, m3) 
Minimize 
Payment 
Minimize 
Losses 
Minimize 
Deviation 
Compromise 
Solution 
4072 (0.96, 0.86, 0.86, 0.46) 4.59 4.6 5.73 5.73 
4071 (0.40, 0.41, 0.41, 0.20) 1.68* 1.68* 1.68* 0 
4011 (0.77, 0.75, 0.75, 0.25) 3.77* 3.77* 3.77* 3.77* 
4012 (0.43, 0.41, 0.41, 0.19) 2.07 0.7 3.28* 1.75 
4021 (0.50, 0.54, 0.54, 0.28) 0 1.23* 1.23* 0 
4031 (0.42, 0.42, 0.42, 0.17) 0 1.47* 1.47* 0 
4042 (0.69, 0.68, 0.68, 0.39) 0 0.32 4.43* 0 
4041 (0.91, 0.99, 0.99,0.00) 0 -1.37 1.06 0 
4062 (0.85, 0.90, 0.90, 0.45) 0 0 0 0.21 
4063 (0.90, 0.97, 0.97, 0.42) 0 0.20 0.18 0 
4051 (0.73, 0.79, 0.79, 0.44) 0 0 0 0 
4047 (0.73, 0.86, 0.86, 0.31) 0 0 0.05 0 
2032 (0.88, 0.80, 0.80, 0.39) 0 1.42 3.17* 0 
1013 (0.65, 0.59, 0.59, 0.21) 1.88* 0.35 1.88* 1.88* 
1012 (0.76, 0.81, 0.81, 0.37) 1.33 2.78* 2.78* 1.85 
1014 (0.93, 0.89, 0.89, 0.40) 0 0.21 2.32* 0 
1022 (0.50, 0.58, 0.58, 0.25) 0 0.91* 0.91* 0.91* 
1021 (0.92, 0.85, 0.85, 0.55) 0 -0.27 0.15 0 
1043 (0.77, 0.69, 0.69, 0.37) 0 0 0 0 
1042 (0.50, 0.50, 0.50, 0.26) 0 0 0 0 
ISO’S BURDEN FROM THESE CONTRACTS 
Total Payment (JP), $ 19.36 36.53 56.35 21.55 
Total Losses (JL), p.u. 6.61 6.25 8.56 6.75 
Total Deviation (JD), p.u. 17.26 17.19 9.63 13.05 
Available Price, ρo 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 
Operation Price, ρ1 0 0.99 0 0 
Operation Price, ρ2 0.86 0.97 0.99 0.90 
Opportunity Price, ρ3 0.25 0.37 0.40 0.25 
Note:  
1. Symbol * denotes reactive power support contracted in the range of opportunity costs 
2. A bold underscored offer price, (e.g., 0.96) denotes that the particular offer is the 
market price setting offer in a particular offer category. 
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3.2.1.2 Market Power in Reactive Power Markets 
We mentioned at the beginning of this chapter that reactive power in a 
competitive framework could provide strategic advantages to certain 
participants by virtue of their location vis-a-vis the configuration of the system. 
In this sub-section we attempt to examine if such strategic advantages do exist 
with any of the providers in our system, whether certain providers have 
market power- i.e., do they manage to remain the price setter under all 
circumstances? If such situations exist, how do we identify those providers? 
Such information can help the ISO to handle the market for reactive power 
more efficiently. 
Say, the contracted providers from base case presume that their reactive 
support will always be necessary due to their strategic location in the system 
and load profile. Consequently, these providers seek market power by offering 
prices higher than their EPF and try to increase the market price. Five gaming 
scenarios (S1 to S5) of high offer prices from these providers are constructed 
below. In S1, all contracted providers offer 20% higher prices than their base-
offer, in S2 scenario they offer 30% higher prices, in S3 40% higher, in S4 
50% higher and in S5 they offer 60% higher prices. The corresponding 
optimal reactive power contracts offered by the ISO based on the compromise 
programming solution are provided in Table 3.2. 
From Table 3.2 we can make the following observations: 
a. Generator “4072” remains the price-setter for ρo from base-case through all 
the gaming scenarios. 
b. As in base-case, ρ1 continues to be zero in all scenarios. 
c. Generator “4062”, which was the price-setter of ρ2 in base-case, does not 
remain so, in the gaming scenarios. Generator “4072” becomes the price-
setter for this component also. 
d. Generator “4011” was the price-setter of ρ3 in base-case. In the gaming 
scenarios, “4021” becomes price-setter in S1, “1012” in S2 and “1013” in 
S3 to S5. 
From the above observations, we can say that when all base-contracted 
generators simultaneously indulge in gaming, generator “4072” clearly retains 
market power and is the price setter for two of the price components. It is also 
seen that the ISO continues to contract generators “4072”, “4011”, “4012” and 
“1013”, under all gaming scenarios. However we note that, except for “4072”, 
the others do not have the capability to set prices in a simultaneous gaming 
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scenario. This, though, may not be true in an individual gaming scenario, and 
is examined and discussed next. 
Table 3.2. Optimal contracts by the ISO in gaming scenarios 
 Reactive Contracts in p.u.MVAr in Different Scenarios 
Bus Base S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 
4072 5.73: ρ0 5.79: ρ0, ρ2 5.84: ρ0, ρ2 5.91: ρ0, ρ2 5.98: ρ0, ρ2 5.96: ρ0, ρ2
4011 3.77*: ρ3 2.52 2.52 2.52 2.52 2.52 
4012 1.75 3.28* 2.17 3.28* 3.28* 3.28* 
4062 0.21: ρ2 - 0.21 - - - 
1013 1.88* 1.88* 1.88* 1.88*: ρ3 1.88*:  ρ3 1.88*: ρ3 
1012 1.85 - 2.78*: ρ3 1.85 1.85 1.85 
1022 0.91* - - - - - 
4021 - 1.23*: ρ3 1.23* - - - 
4063 - 0.19 - 0.19 - 0.18 
1014 - 1.80 - - - - 
4031 - - - 1.47* - - 
2032 - - - - - 0.86 
ISO’S BURDEN FROM THE CONTRACTS 
JP 21.55 25.26 27.46 29.73 27.22 33.51 
JL 6.75 6.72 6.72 6.74 6.86 6.78 
JD 13.05 13.02 13.02 13.04 14.50 13.08 
ρo 0.96 1.15 1.24 1.34 1.43 1.53 
ρ1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ρ2 0.90 1.03 1.12 1.20 1.29 1.38 
ρ3 0.25 0.28 0.37 0.30 0.32 0.34 
Note: 
1. Symbol * denotes reactive power support contracted in the range of opportunity costs 
2. In column-1, the top seven generator buses (shown in bold) are the base-case contracts. 
Remaining five buses below are those generators which appear in scenarios when the 
base-case generators offer high prices. 
3. When a generator becomes a price-setter for a particular category, it is shown against 
the reactive power contract along with price ρo, ρ1, ρ2 or ρ3. 
We now consider only one of the four generators indulging in gaming, at a 
time, by increasing its offer price by 60%, while others offer their true EPF. 
The results are shown in Table 3.3. 
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Table 3.3. Optimal contracts when one generator indulges in gaming 
 p.u.MVAr Reactive Contracts in p.u.MVAr when this Generator Indulges in Gaming 
Bus Base “4072” “4011” “4012” “1013” 
4072 5.73: ρ0 5.80: ρ0, ρ2 6.49: ρ0 5.73: ρ0 4.62: ρ0 
4011 3.77*: ρ3 3.77*: ρ3 - 3.77*: ρ3 3.77*: ρ3 
4012 1.75 2.19 2.19 1.75 1.44 
4062 0.21: ρ2 - 0.21: ρ2 0.21: ρ2 0.20: ρ2 
1013 1.88* 1.88* 1.25 1.88* - 
1012 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.85 
1022 0.91* - - 0.91* - 
4021 - - 0.82 - - 
4063 - 0.18 - - - 
1014 - - 2.01 - 2.01 
2032 - 0.65 1.85 - - 
4071 - - 1.12 - 1.68* 
1022 - - 0.61 - - 
ISO’s BURDEN FROM THESE CONTRACTS 
JP 21.55 32.77 26.11 21.55 21.17 
JL 6.75 6.75 6.89 6.75 6.83 
JD 13.05 13.05 13.37 13.05 13.13 
ρo 0.96 1.53 0.96 0.96 0.96 
ρ1 0 0 0 0 0 
ρ2 0.86 1.38 0.90 0.90 0.90 
ρ3 0.25 0.25 0 0.25 0.25 
Note: 
1. Symbol * denotes reactive power support contracted in the range of opportunity costs 
2. When a generator becomes a price-setter for a particular offer category, it is shown 
against the reactive power contract along with price ρo, ρ1, ρ2 or ρ3. 
From Table 3.3, we observe the following: 
a. When generator “4072” indulges in gaming (see col. 3): 
i. Generator “4072” retains itself as a price-setter for ρo and increases its 
market power to become the price-setter for ρ2 as well. 
ii. Consequently, ρo and ρ2 increase significantly from base-case. 
iii. Though two new generators are contracted in place of “4062” and 
“1022”, other base-case contracts are still retained by the ISO. The 
payment burden for ISO increases by 52% for the reactive power 
services. 
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iv. System loss and transaction deviations are maintained at base case 
levels. 
v. The ISO cannot avoid contracting reactive support in significant 
quantities from generator “4072”. 
b. When generator “4011” indulges in gaming (see col. 4): 
i. Generator “4011” gets eliminated from the market. The ISO establishes 
contracts with several new providers. 
ii. Prices are at almost similar (if not better) levels as in base-case, through 
contracts with a wide range of generators. No contract required for 
opportunity component of reactive power and hence, ρ3=0. 
iii. ISO pays about 20% more to maintain losses and transaction deviations 
at same levels as the base case. 
c. When generator “4012” indulges in gaming (see col. 5): 
i. Generator “4012” remains in the market, contracted by the ISO. All 
other generators contracted in base-case also continue to retain their 
contracts. The price-setters, price-levels, payment, loss and deviation 
levels also remain the same as in base-case. 
ii. In summary, gaming by generator “4012” does not affect the system in 
any way. 
d. When generator “1013” indulges in gaming (see col. 6): 
i. Generator “1013” gets eliminated from the market and is no longer 
contracted by the ISO. Some new reactive power contracts are brought 
in by ISO. 
ii. The price-setters from base-case stay as price-setters. 
iii. The price level remains almost the same as the base-case level. Payment, 
losses and deviations are thus very little affected from base-case. 
From the analysis above we conclude that only generator “4072” has the 
capability to influence market prices and has immense market power. The 
other generators that continue to remain contracted under all scenarios 
however cannot exercise market power. If they attempt to do so, they get 
eliminated from the competition. In summary we can say that the system 
under investigation does provide a competitive marketplace for reactive power. 
However, the imperfection arising from the market power of “4072” needs to 
be removed. 
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To sum up we note that, the proposed market structure and settlement 
model implicitly negotiates market power of strategically located providers. 
For example, if the ISO seeks only loss minimization, it would end up 
contracting several providers (Table 3.1). Quite a few of them could hold 
market power in the long run. On the other hand, when the ISO seeks 
minimum payment, the cheapest offers, irrespective of provider's location and 
contribution to losses, are contracted. Now, most of the providers who were 
located at strategic buses from loss minimization approach are eliminated. The 
same happens with transaction deviation minimization approach. Finally, after 
the compromise solution is obtained, we are left with seven providers, who are 
essential to the system from all considerations. Thereafter we carry out 
analysis to determine if any of the seven providers hold market power by 
gaming. It is seen that none of the providers except "4072" can hold market 
power if they indulge in gaming. Thus "4072" is the most critical node and 
needs 'capital investments'. Only a 'market design' or 'bidding framework' 
cannot handle the inefficiency existing at this bus. 
3.2.2 A Note on Computational Aspects 
The reactive power market model to minimize payments (Section-3.1.1) and 
the composite model minimizing the compromise objective (Section-3.1.4) are 
mixed-integer non-linear programming (MINLP) problems with presence of 
non-convexities. The models are solved in Generalized Algebraic Modeling 
Systems (GAMS), a high-level programming platform, using DICOPT 
(DIscrete COntinuous OPTimization) solver. The DICOPT solver is based on 
the extensions of the outer approximation algorithm for the equality relaxation 
strategy. It iteratively invokes the MINOS5 and XA10.0 solvers for non-linear 
programming (NLP) and mixed-integer programming (MIP) solutions 
respectively [26], [31]. 
The NLP solution is obtained by MINOS5 by extremizing an augmented 
Lagrangian function using the reduced gradient algorithm. XA10.0 uses the 
primal/dual simplex method to obtain the linear programming solution, 
combined with the 'branch and bound' method to obtain the MIP solution. 
Under certain circumstances the solution obtained from DICOPT may not 
be globally optimum. This can happen when, during the iterative process of 
the NLP and MIP sub-problems, MINOS5 fails to handle non-convexities. On 
the other hand, the GAMS/DICOPT algorithm has built-in provisions to 
handle non-convexities and hence, we can, with a fair degree of confidence, 
rely on the GAMS/DICOPT optimal solutions to being globally optimal. On 
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the other hand, it should be mentioned that there is lot of work ongoing in the 
area of global optimization methods [32], [33] and improved techniques (or 
solvers with higher confidence levels) would appear in the literature in the 
coming years. 
The reactive power market models minimizing transmission loss (Section-
3.1.2) and transaction deviation (Section-3.1.3) are NLP problems, and solved 
using GAMS/MINOS5 solver. 
Both, the GAMS/DICOPT and GAMS/MINOS5 efficiently handle the 32-
bus Cigré system considered. However, we should note that the computational 
burden would inevitably increase for a larger system, particularly so, for the 
MINLP models. Although algorithms for the solution of MINLP problems 
have yet not reached the maturity level of NLP or LP problems, there are 
global optimization methods available in the literature. In this context, global 
search techniques based on genetic algorithms, simulated annealing, etc. have 
a very promising scope for applications in such problems. In Table 3.4, we 
present the computational burden involved in order to obtain the optimal 
solutions for each model. The programs were solved on a Pentium-II 400 
MHz computer with 256 MB RAM. 
Table 3.4. Computational requirements for solving the model 
 Minimize Payment 
Minimize 
Losses 
Minimize 
Deviations 
Compromise 
Solution 
Type of Model MINLP NLP NLP MINLP 
Solver Used DICOPT MINOS5 MINOS5 DICOPT 
No. of Equations 468 208 208 468 
No. of Variables 1152 1092 1092 1152 
Nonlinear variables 761 761 761 761 
Integer variables 59 0 0 59 
Model generation time, sec 0.26 0.23 0.20 0.261 
Model execution time, sec 0.39 0.26 0.26 0.301 
Model solution time, sec 17.148 1.132 0.629 57.129 
3.3 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The design of a competitive market for reactive power services in deregulated 
electricity systems has been attempted in this chapter. The market is based on 
offers from generators or synchronous condensers for four components of 
service. The ISO, who is the sole buyer, settles the market using uniform price 
auction, using a compromise optimization approach, on an optimal power 
flow based model. The compromise market settlement attains the best possible 
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solution keeping various contradictory objectives such as total payment, 
system loss and transaction curtailment, within reasonable limits. 
An expected payment function has been formulated based on generator's 
reactive power capability characteristic and an offer price framework has been 
proposed. The proposed market structure and settlement model implicitly 
negotiates price setting by strategically located generators. Additionally, 
possibility of market power with contracted providers has been examined in 
detail. Through five scenarios of simultaneous gaming, it is found that 
generator “4072” retains immense market power and acts as the price-setter 
for two of the price components. Due to the nature of the system load profile 
and network configuration, the ISO is compelled to contract generators 
“4072”, “4011”, “4012” and “1013”, under all circumstances. However, when 
these generators take recourse to gaming (one generator gaming while others 
offer rationally) only generator “4072” holds on to its reactive power ‘market 
power’. Other generators end up with reduced contracts or complete 
elimination from the market. Thus it can be concluded that bus “4072” is one 
of the strategic buses in the system where a reactive power provider will 
always have immense market power. 
The ISO should seek measures to remove this market power from bus 
“4072” in order to improve the efficiency of the market. One possible way of 
removing this market power at bus “4072” is by investing in more reactive 
support (not necessarily reactive power ancillary service providers, e.g., 
capacitor banks). This will help reduce the ISO’s burden of increased 
payments as well as reduce the risk of high market prices through gaming. 
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CHAPTER 4  
LOCALIZED REACTIVE POWER MARKETS 
USING THE CONCEPT OF VOLTAGE 
CONTROL AREAS* 
A competitive market for reactive power ancillary services has been 
proposed in Chapter-3 wherein the market settlement model is based on a 
uniform price auction and a single price for the whole system is determined 
for each of the reactive power service components. All the selected reactive 
power suppliers in the system are paid this uniform price. It has been argued 
that such uniform prices for all market participants would lead to a fair and 
competitive market and the participants will not have any incentive to bid 
higher than their true costs.  
In this chapter, we examine the possibility of designing localized reactive 
power markets for individual voltage control areas of the system. As we 
have discussed earlier, reactive power and voltage control services are 
required to be provided locally, and hence the reactive power market can be 
considered more as a local market than a system-wide market. A local 
market structure, with a reactive power price for each local area is proposed 
in the following sections. The concept of electrical distance has been used to 
break up the system into independent voltage control areas. A new payment 
objective function is developed to get individual uniform prices for each area. 
The Cigré 32-bus system is used, wherein it is separated into three voltage 
control areas and the uniform reactive power market prices are obtained for 
each area respectively. 
                                                          
* Some parts of this chapter has been communicated to publication as the following paper:  
• J. Zhong, E. Nobile, A. Bose and K. Bhattacharya, “Localized Reactive Power Markets 
Using the Concept of Voltage Control Areas”, IEEE Transactions on Power Systems. 
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4.1 CREATING VOLTAGE CONTROL AREAS FROM A 
WHOLE SYSTEM 
A given power system can be separated into some non-overlapping voltage 
control areas comprising coherent bus groups. A set of buses can be 
classified as a voltage control area if they are sufficiently uncoupled 
electrically, from its neighboring areas. And the controllable reactive power 
in the area should be enough to master the voltage changes of the buses in 
the area. A criterion of dividing voltage control area is that the voltage 
profile of one control area is mainly controlled by the reactive power sources 
in that area, while the controls within the area are very less influenced by 
other areas [34].  
In the French grid, the concept of electrical distance and typological 
analysis algorithms are used by Electricite de France (EDF) to divide voltage 
control areas. Their two stage systematic method, which has proved to be 
effective for determining control areas in French power system, is described 
in [35]. The first stage of the method is to calculate the electrical distances 
between buses in the system. The second stage is to group the buses 
following the typological analysis methods. 
In [36], the concept of electrical distance is used to analyze “local” 
voltage stability problem and assess voltage security. The concept of 
electrical distance to analysis of competitive ancillary service markets for 
voltage control in local areas has recently been proposed in [37].  
4.1.1 Electrical Distance 
The relationships between network bus voltages and currents can be 
represented using admittance matrix “Y” or impedance matrix “Z” written 
as follows: 
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The Y bus matrix and the Z bus matrix are inverse matrices of each other. 
The elements of Z bus matrix reflects the voltage variations following 
changes in current injections at given buses. We can also write the real and 
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reactive power injection relationships, in linearized form, from the standard 
load flow equations as follows: 
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Where [J] is the Jacobian matrix and J1, J2, J3 and J4 are sub-matrices of J 
of appropriate dimensions, and are given in terms of the following partial 
differentials:  
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Neglecting the coupling between δ and reactive power, i.e., J3=0, the 
relationship between ∆Q and ∆V can be written from (4.1) as follows: 
V
V
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Or, we can write,  
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∂=∆=∆ −14J  (4.3) 
The matrix [ ]VQ ∂∂ /  is a part of the Jacobian matrix J, while its inverse 
[ ]QV ∂∂ /  is called the sensitivity matrix. Both matrices are real and non-
symmetrical. The elements of [ ]QV ∂∂ /  reflect the propagation of voltage 
variations following reactive power injections at given buses. The magnitude 
of voltage coupling between two buses can be quantified by the maximum 
attenuation of voltage variations between these two buses. These 
attenuations are easy to be obtained from the [ ]QV ∂∂ /  matrix, by just 
dividing the elements of each column by the diagonal term. A matrix of 
attenuations between all the buses of the system, whose terms are written as 
αij is then available. We thus have,   
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Generally, αij≠αji. In order to have symmetric property in the electrical 
distance, the formulation below is used to define the electrical distance 
between two nodes i and j, 
)(LogDD jiijjiij αα ⋅−==  (4.5)  
Where, Dij is the electrical distance between node i and j, and it has the 
properties of positivity and symmetry. This electrical distance can represent 
the degree of influences arising from voltage changes on other buses. The 
step by step method to obtain the separated voltage control areas is given 
below: 
1. Calculate the Jacobian matrix J and hence obtain the sub-matrix J4, 
where [ ]VQ ∂∂= /J4 .  
2. Inverse J4. Say, 14JQ
VB −=∂
∂= , and the elements of matrix B are 
written as bij, where jiij Q/Vb ∂∂= . 
3. Obtain attenuation matrix, αij, between all the nodes. 
αij=bij/bjj. 
4. Calculate electrical distances Dij. 
Dij=-log(αij, αji) 
5. Normalize the electrical distances as follows: 
Dij=Dij/Max(Di1, …,DiN) 
4.2 REACTIVE POWER MARKET FOR LOCAL VOLTAGE 
CONTROL AREAS 
The reactive power market model to be presented here is an extension of the 
model discussed in Chapter-3. In this model, the reactive power market is 
settled for individual voltage control areas. All market participants submit 
their offers to the ISO in terms of the four components as discussed in 
Section-2.3.2. In the present model, we consider minimization of the 
payment function only, and not the loss and deviation functions. Therefore, 
we do not need the compromise objective any more. This does not affect the 
conclusions or observations in any way. But helps to reduce the 
computational burden involved in solving the compromise objective based 
Chapter 4 Localized Reactive Power Markets Using the Concept of Voltage Control Areas 
 68
optimization problem. A new payment function is developed and discussed 
here, that obtain the uniform reactive power market prices for individual 
voltage control areas. 
Suppose we have three voltage control areas, Zone A, Zone B and Zone C, 
with respective uniform market prices ρa, ρb and ρc, for each area. The 
subscripts “gena”, “genb” and “genc” denote the generators in Zone A, Zone 
B and Zone C, respectively. Thus, we can write the payment objective 
function based on zonal reactive power prices as follows:  
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 (4.6) 
In (4.6), ρ0 is the uniform availability price for the whole system; ρ1 is the 
uniform operating price for absorbing reactive power; ρ2a, ρ2b and ρ2c are the 
uniform operating prices for producing reactive power in zone A, zone B 
and zone C, respectively; ρ3a, ρ3b and ρ3c are the uniform opportunity prices 
for zone A, zone B and zone C, respectively.  
The constraints associated with the payment minimization problem are the 
same as that discussed in Chapter-3, except for the constraints of 
determining uniform market prices. The constraints are listed below. 
• Load Flow Equations (3.2), (3.3) 
• Reactive Power Relational Constraints & Limits (3.4)-- (3.6) 
• Reactive Power Generation Limits (3.12), (3.13) 
• Bus Voltage Limits (3.14) 
• Limit on Bilateral Transactions (3.15) 
• Determining Uniform Market Prices (3.7), (3.8), (3.11) as well as the 
following constraints: 
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( ) A Zonei      ,mWW a2i,2i,3i,2 ∈∀≤⋅+ ρ  (4.7) ( ) B Zonei      ,mWW b2i,2i,3i,2 ∈∀≤⋅+ ρ  (4.8) ( ) C Zonei      ,mWW c2i,2i,3i,2 ∈∀≤⋅+ ρ  (4.9) 
 
A Zonei      ,mW a3i,3i,3 ∈∀≤⋅ ρ  (4.10) 
B Zonei      ,mW b3i,3i,3 ∈∀≤⋅ ρ  (4.11) 
C Zonei      ,mW c3i,3i,3 ∈∀≤⋅ ρ  (4.12) 
4.3 CASE STUDY WITH CIGRÉ 32 BUS SYSTEM 
The same Cigré 32-bus test system used in earlier chapters (refer Appendix-
A) is used here to analyze the localized reactive power market proposed in 
this Chapter.  
Following the five steps discussed in Section-4.1.1, the normalized 
electrical distances Dij between generator buses “i” and all the buses “j” are 
calculated. To avoid analyzing too many electrical distance numbers 
between buses, we write a program in MATLAB to group the buses 
according to their distances Dij (Table 4.1). In Table 4.1, columns 2, 3, 4 and 
5 list the buses whose electrical distances with the generator buses of 
column 1 are within the range Dij≤0.10, 0.10<Dij≤0.20, 0.20<Dij≤0.25 and 
0.25<Dij≤0.30, respectively. 
Considering the electrical distances obtained in Table 4.1 and the 
topology structure of the network, the Cigré 32 bus system is divided into 
five Voltage Control Areas, zone-1 to zone-5, as shown in Figure 4.1. The 
electrical distances between the buses lying in different zones, are relatively 
further, compared to the distances between buses in same zone.  
It is shown in Figure 4.1 that there are eight buses in zone-1, ten buses in 
zone-2, three buses in zone-3, eight buses in zone-4 and three buses in zone-
5. Zone-3 and zone-5 are relatively small compare to other zones. And there 
are only two generators in zone-3 and one generator in zone-5, while both 
zone-1 and zone-2 have seven generators each. It is difficult to have a 
market in a zone that has too few generators. After examined the electrical 
distances between the buses in zone-3, zone-5 and buses in other zones, we 
found that zone-3 and zone-5 are closer to zone-4 than to other two zones. 
Thus we combine zone-3, zone-4 and zone-5 as one zone.  
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The new separation of voltage control areas is shown in Figure 4.2. In the 
new separation, we have Zone A, Zone B and Zone C. 
Table 4.1. Electrical distances for grouping buses into voltage control areas 
The buses having electrical distances in the given range   
with the corresponding generator bus  
Genera
-tor  
Bus  Dij ≤ 0.10 0.10<Dij ≤ 0.20 0.20< Dij ≤ 0.25 0.25< Dij ≤ 0.30 
4072 4071  4012 1012 
4071 4072 4012 1012  
4012 1012 4022 4071, 1014 4072, 1022 
4021  4042, 4032 4031 4044  
4031  4041, 4022, 4032, 2031  4021, 2032, 1022 
4042  4021, 4032, 4043, 4044 4046, 1044 4031, 4045, 4047 
4041  4031, 4061 4044 4062, 4032, 2031, 1044
4062 4063, 4061  4041, 4045 1045 
4063 4062 4061  4041, 4045 
4051  4045, 1045 4044 1041, 1044 
4047 4046 4043 4042, 4044 1044 
2032  2031 4031  
1013 1014 1011, 1012 4012  
1012 4012 1014 1013 4071, 4022 
1014 1013 4012, 1012, 1011   
1022 4022 1021  4031 
1021  1022 4022  
1043 1041 4044, 1044, 1045 1042, 4045 4043 
1042  4044, 1044, 1045 1043, 1042, 4045  
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Figure 4.1. Cigré 32-bus System – Five Voltage Control Areas 
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Figure 4.2. Cigré 32-bus System – Re-organization to Three Voltage Control Areas 
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Four study cases are now simulated to examine the proposed localized 
reactive power market.  
• Case-0 simulates the reactive power market considering the whole 
system as one control area, and one set of uniform market prices for 
the whole system is obtained.  
• Case-1 simulates the market considering three voltage control areas as 
that obtained earlier, and three sets of uniform market prices are 
obtained for the three areas, respectively.  
• Both Case-0 and Case-1 use the same price offers from generators. By 
comparing the results of Case-0 and Case-1, we can see the advantages 
of considering voltage control areas for reactive power service price 
settlement.  
• Case-2 and Case-3 simulates gaming scenarios over Case-1, wherein 
the service providers at bus 4072 offers 50% and 60% higher prices for 
its service. 
Each provider offers four components, the availability offer a0, the cost of 
loss offer m1 and m2, and opportunity offer m3 as shown in the following 
tables. A uniform random number generator is used to simulate the four 
component offer prices, a0, m1, m2 and m3. 
4.3.1 Case-0: System as Whole 
In Case-0, the market settlement scheme is run as discussed in Section-3.1. 
In this case, the uniform market prices ρ0, ρ1, ρ2 and ρ3 are obtained for the 
whole system. The purpose of calculating Case-0 in this chapter is to 
compare the results with Case-1, in which uniform market prices are 
obtained separately for three voltage control areas. The optimal reactive 
power contracts obtained for Case-0 are provided in Table 4.2.  
In the following tables, the “*” denotes reactive power support contracted 
in the range of opportunity costs, and a bold underscored offer price, (e.g., 
0.96) denotes that the particular offer is the market price setting offer. 
In this case, market prices are determined by the highest offer of the 
system. We get availability price ρ0=0.96, operation price ρ2=1.12, and 
opportunity price ρ3=0.25. Generators “4072”, “2032” and “4011” are the 
corresponding price-setters. The under-excited operation price ρ1=0.  
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Table 4.2. Case 0 – reactive power schemes and uniform prices for the whole system  
 Bus Offer Prices (ao, m1, m2, m3) 
Reactive Contracts in 
p.u.MVAr 
4072 (0.96, 0.86, 0.86, 0.46) 6.61 
4071 (0.40, 0.41, 0.41, 0.20) 0 
4011 (0.77, 0.75, 0.75, 0.25) 3.77* 
4012 (0.43, 0.41, 0.41, 0.19) 3.28* 
1013 (0.50, 0.54, 0.54, 0.28) 1.25 
1012 (0.42, 0.42, 0.42, 0.17) 0 
 
1014 (0.69, 0.68, 0.68, 0.39) 1.66 
4021 (0.91, 1.29, 1.29, 0.70) 0 
4031 (0.85, 1.17, 1.17, 0.59) 0 
4042 (0.90, 1.26, 1.26, 0.55) 0 
4041 (0.73, 1.03, 1.03, 0.00) 0 
1021 (0.65, 0.77, 0.77, 0.27) 0 
1022 (0.88, 1.03, 1.03, 0.50) 0.61 
 
2032 (0.73, 1.12, 1.12, 0.40) 1.74 
4062 (0.76, 1.05, 1.05, 0.48) 0 
4063 (0.93, 1.16, 1.16, 0.52) 0 
4051 (0.50, 0.76, 0.76, 0.33) 0 
4047 (0.92, 1.11, 1.11, 0.71) 0 
1043 (0.77, 0.90, 0.90, 0.48) 0 
 
1042 (0.50, 0.65, 0.65, 0.34) 0 
ISO’s burden from these contracts 
Total Payment (JP), $ 28.40 
Available Price, ρo 0.96 
Operation Price, ρ1 0 
Operation Price, ρ2 1.12 
 
Opportunity Price, ρ3 0.25 
 
4.3.2 Case-1: Considering Voltage Control Areas 
The payment function (4.6), which calculates market prices for three zones, 
is used in the present case to minimize the payment. The optimal reactive 
power contracts and uniform market prices are provided in Table 4.3.  
In this case, market prices are obtained for three zones.  In each zone, 
market prices are determined from the highest accepted offer from the zone. 
From Table 4.3 we note the following:  
• The generator “4072” is selected as price-setter of availability price for 
all zones, with the uniform availability price being ρ0=0.96.  
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• No generator is selected to provide reactive power in zone C.  
• The under-excited operation price ρ1 is zero since we no generator is 
contracted to absorb reactive power.  
• For zone A, ρ2=0.86 and ρ3=0.19; generators on buses “4072” and 
“4012” are the corresponding price-setters.  
• For zone B, ρ2=1.12 and ρ3=0.50; generators on buses “2032” and 
“1022” are the corresponding price-setters. 
By comparing the results of Table 4.2 and Table 4.3, we can have 
following observations:  
a. For zone A, the uniform market prices obtained in Case-0 are ρ2=1.12 
and ρ3=0.25. These prices decrease to ρ2=0.86 and ρ3=0.19 in Case-1, 
when the market settlement is based on Voltage Control Areas . 
b. The payment in Case-0 is 28.40. It decreases to 23.77 in Case-1. 
We can see that both market price and the total payment made by the ISO 
to procure reactive power service are reduced after we settle the market with 
respect to voltage control areas.  
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Table 4.3. Case 1 – reactive power schemes and uniform prices for three zones  
 Bus Offer Prices (ao, m1, m2, m3) 
Reactive Contracts in 
p.u.MVAr 
4072 (0.96, 0.86, 0.86, 0.46) 6.82 
4071 (0.40, 0.41, 0.41, 0.20) 0 
4011 (0.77, 0.75, 0.75, 0.25) 2.52 
4012 (0.43, 0.41, 0.41, 0.19) 3.28* 
1013 (0.50, 0.54, 0.54, 0.28) 1.25 
1012 (0.42, 0.42, 0.42, 0.17) 2.78* 
Zone 
A 
1014 (0.69, 0.68, 0.68, 0.39) 0 
4021 (0.91, 1.29, 1.29, 0.70) 0 
4031 (0.85, 1.17, 1.17, 0.59) 0 
4042 (0.90, 1.26, 1.26, 0.55) 0 
4041 (0.73, 1.03, 1.03, 0.00) 0 
1021 (0.65, 0.77, 0.77, 0.27) 0 
1022 (0.88, 1.03, 1.03, 0.50) 0.91* 
Zone 
B 
2032 (0.73, 1.12, 1.12, 0.40) 1.68 
4062 (0.76, 1.05, 1.05, 0.48) 0 
4063 (0.93, 1.16, 1.16, 0.52) 0 
4051 (0.50, 0.76, 0.76, 0.33) 0 
4047 (0.92, 1.11, 1.11, 0.71) 0 
1043 (0.77, 0.90, 0.90, 0.48) 0 
Zone 
C 
1042 (0.50, 0.65, 0.65, 0.34) 0 
ISO’s burden from these contracts 
Total Payment (JP), $ 23.77 
Zone A B C 
Available Price, ρo 0.96 
Operation Price, ρ1 0 
Operation Price, ρ2 0.86 1.12 0 
Opportunity Price, ρ3 0.19 0.50 0 
4.3.3 Case-2 and Case-3: Gaming by Generator 4072 
In Case-2 and Case-3, we increase the prices m1, m2 and m3 offered by the 
generator on bus 4072 by 50% and by 60% respective over the Case-0 and 
Case-1 prices. The reactive power schemes obtained when minimizing 
payment are provided in Table 4.4. In the table, the superscript 1, 2 or 3 
denote that the particular offer is the market price setting offer obtained in 
Case-1, Case-2 or Case-3, respectively. 
From Table 4.4, we can see that reactive power schemes are almost 
unchanged in Zone B and Zone C, when the offer prices of 4072, which is in 
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Zone A, are increased. In Zone A, the generator at bus 4071, which is the 
closest to 4072, is selected to provide reactive power when the offer prices 
of 4072 increase. 
Table 4.4. Reactive power scheme comparison in three cases 
Reactive Power (p.u)  Bus Offer Prices (ao, m1, m2, m3) Case-1 Case-2 Case-3 
Case-1 (0.961, 0.86, 0.861, 0.46) 
Case-2 (0.962, 1.29, 1.292, 0.70) 4072 
Case-3 (0.963, 1.38, 1.383, 0.74) 
6.82 
5.62 
5.61 
4071 (0.40, 0.41, 0.41, 0.20) 0 1.68* 1.68* 
4011 (0.77, 0.75, 0.75, 0.252,3) 2.52 3.77* 3.77* 
4012 (0.43, 0.41, 0.41, 0.191) 3.28* 3.28* 3.28* 
1013 (0.50, 0.54, 0.54, 0.28) 1.25 0 0 
1012 (0.42, 0.42, 0.42, 0.17) 2.78* 0 0 
Zone 
A 
1014 (0.69, 0.68, 0.68, 0.39) 0 2.01 2.01 
4021 (0.91, 1.29, 1.29, 0.70) 0 0 0 
4031 (0.85, 1.17, 1.17, 0.59) 0 0 0 
4042 (0.90, 1.26, 1.26, 0.55) 0 0 0 
4041 (0.73, 1.03, 1.03, 0.00) 0 0 0 
1021 (0.65, 0.77, 0.77, 0.27) 0 0 0 
1022 (0.88, 1.03, 1.03, 0.501,2,3) 0.91* 0.87* 0.87* 
Zone 
B 
2032 (0.73, 1.12, 1.121,2,3, 0.40) 1.68 1.61 1.64 
4062 (0.76, 1.05, 1.05, 0.48) 0 0 0 
4063 (0.93, 1.16, 1.16, 0.52) 0 0 0 
4051 (0.50, 0.76, 0.76, 0.33) 0 0 0 
4047 (0.92, 1.11, 1.11, 0.71) 0 0 0 
1043 (0.77, 0.90, 0.90, 0.48) 0 0 0 
Zone 
C 
1042 (0.50, 0.65, 0.65, 0.34) 0 0 0 
    
The uniform market prices obtained in the three cases are compared in 
Table 4.5. We can see that the market prices of Zone B and Zone C retain 
the same even after a 60% increase in offer prices of 4072. This shows that 
gaming offers in one zone will not affect the market prices of other zones.  
Table 4.5. Uniform market prices comparison in three cases 
 Case-1 Case-2 Case-3 
 Zone A Zone B Zone C Zone A Zone B Zone C Zone A Zone B Zone C
Available Price, ρo 0.96 0.96 0.96 
Operation Price, ρ1 0 0 0 
Operation Price, ρ2 0.86 1.12 0 1.29 1.12 0 1.38 1.12 0 
Opportunity Price, ρ3 0.19 0.50 0 0.25 0.50 0 0.25 0.50 0 
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4.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The competitive market for reactive power services based on localized 
voltage control areas has been developed in this chapter. The market is based 
on four components of price offers from generators. The ISO settles the 
market for individual voltage control areas while minimizing the payment of 
the whole system.    
The concept of electrical distance has been introduced. The concept has 
been used to separate out from the Cigré 32-bus system three voltage control 
areas. Reactive power market prices for three control areas are obtained by 
the ISO based on the offers. From the analysis of the results, we have 
following conclusions: 
• Considering the reactive power market as localized at voltage control 
areas will reduce the payment burden of the ISO in procurement of 
reactive power services in the system. 
• The prices of reactive power services in the areas with lower price offers 
are lower than the prices in the areas with higher price offers. This means 
that considering localized markets according to voltage control areas is 
more reasonable in deregulated system compared to considering one 
uniform price for the whole system.  
• In the localized voltage control area based reactive power market, if a 
generator from one control area attempts to game the price, the market 
prices in other voltage control areas will not be affected. 
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CHAPTER 5  
DESIGN OF COMPETITIVE MARKETS FOR 
SPINNING RESERVE SERVICES* 
5.1 SPINNING RESERVE SERVICES 
In the context of power sector deregulation, secure operation of the power 
system is a challenging issue for the ISO which is faced with the difficult 
task of providing system security to various participants including providers 
and purchasers that is fair and equitable. 
In pool type of markets, system security is often incorporated within the 
market settlement process. For example, in New York and PJM power pools, 
the ISO carries out a security constrained economic dispatch simulation 
based on energy price offers, start-up cost offers, and minimum and 
maximum generation levels [38]. In the case of PJM, the security constraints 
are subsequently input to a unit commitment model by the ISO to obtain 
generation and commitment schedules. In the context of New Zealand 
Electricity Market [39] also, various security constraints are simultaneously 
incorporated within the market clearing mechanism. The scheduling, pricing 
and dispatch model takes into account branch flow limits, generator ramp 
rates, fast acting reserves (6 seconds), sustained reserve (acting within 60 
seconds), and various restrictions on clearance of spinning reserves and 
reserve capacity vis-à-vis the amount of power generation offers cleared. 
In the New England Power Pool a 10-minute spinning reserve market is 
operated by the ISO [40]. All generators and dispatchable loads that are 
capable of providing such a service can submit offers. A ramp-rate 
constrained economic dispatch is performed to determine the desired 
dispatch points and real-time marginal prices ignoring reserve requirements. 
                                                          
* Some parts of this chapter has been published in the following paper: 
• J. Zhong and K. Bhattacharya, “Design of competitive markets for spinning reserve 
services,” Proceedings of IEEE Power Engineering Society Summer Meeting, Chicago, IL, 
July 2002, pp 1627-1632. 
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These economic dispatch results are used to simulate lost opportunity cost 
associated with resources that can potentially provide 10-minute spinning 
reserve.  
Flynn et al. [41] proposed a method of generation scheduling in a 
competitive market that considers the reliability of the generating units. A 
gross pool structure is used to consider energy and ancillary services 
simultaneously. The optimization model determines the market settlement 
and provides the real power price and spinning reserve price, subject to 
various constraints. The level of reserve at each time period is determined by 
comparing the cost of supplying the reserve with the expected cost of not 
supplying it. 
Similarly in [42] a market structure where generators offer their energy 
supply capabilities, ramp rates, and spinning reserve services while the ISO 
is responsible for both the market and system security has been developed. A 
method considering reliability and reserve in competitive generation 
scheduling is proposed. Augmented Lagrangian dual algorithm is used to 
formulate the problem, and reserve cost is included in the model. Generation 
ready-reserve capacity assessment is discussed in [43] and [44]. In [45], an 
on-line ready-reserve determination system is proposed. An artificial neural 
network using back-propagation learning rule is used to yield the amount of 
ready reserve. 
Contrary to the pool where market settlement and system security have 
often been handled simultaneously, the bilateral contract dominated markets, 
such as those in the Nordic countries, have a disaggregated framework. The 
market settlement does not incorporate any security considerations. After the 
market is settled, the ISO incorporates available tools for security 
management and oversees that the trading schedules are fulfilled. These 
activities are outside the market settlement process and are usually managed 
through long-term contractual arrangements for spinning reserves and 
through short-term balance service markets. 
While most of the work in spinning reserve scheduling or their market 
design has considered the problem aggregated within a market settlement 
process, we treat the issue independently. We propose the design of a 
spinning reserve service (SRS) market that functions in an isolated 
framework similar to the Nordic electricity market, where only system 
security and not market settlement is considered by the ISO. 
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5.2 DESIGN OF A SPINNING RESERVE SERVICE MARKET 
THAT IS INDEPENDENT OF THE ENERGY MARKET 
As per NERC Operating Policy-10 [19] spinning reserve is the amount of 
generation made available to restore generation and demand balance in the 
system after a contingency has occurred. Some portion of the spinning 
reserve is frequency responsive in order to arrest frequency decline 
immediately after an outage. 
The ISO or a similar authority usually evaluates the gross spinning 
reserve requirement for the system about a year in advance. Subsequently, 
the ISO is responsible on a day-to-day and hour-to-hour basis, to ensure that 
this reserve is available when required. The ISO procures this service from 
synchronized generating units that are able to respond within 10 minutes (in 
North America) or 15 minutes (in the Nordic) from the request while 
satisfying their ramp rates. 
In this chapter, the design of a competitive market for spinning reserve 
service is proposed. The market works on the assumption that short-term 
contracts take place between the ISO and generators selected to provide the 
service. Uniform market price of spinning reserve service is derived from an 
auction model that incorporates both market and reserve constraints. The 
time frame of the working of the spinning reserve service market is shown in 
Figure 5.1. 
 
Time k-1 k k+1 
Offers for 
SRS 
submitted 
to ISO 
for hour 
’k’ 
Offers for 
SRS 
submitted 
to ISO for 
hour 
’k+1’
Offers for 
SRS 
submitted 
to ISO 
for hour 
’k+2’ 
Market settlement 
of SRS for hour ’k’ 
Market settlement of 
SRS for hour ’k+1’ 
Market settlement of 
SRS for hour ’k+2’ 
Call for SRS for hour ’k-1’ Call for SRS for hour ’k’ 
Actual power delivery for ’k-1’ Actual power delivery for ’k’ 
 
Figure 5.1. Time-frame of the functioning of the spinning reserve service market 
It can be noted from Figure 5.1 that the generators submit their offers for 
the one hour period between k-1 and k at hour k-1, based on which, the 
spinning reserve service market is settled. The ISO procures a pool of 
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service providers, along with their cleared spinning reserve quantities, to call 
for in real-time between hour k-1 to k. This is repeated for the next hour and 
so on. 
Each generating unit participating in the spinning reserve service market 
offers the ISO the quantity of spinning reserve, SR, (MW) that can be made 
available, and offer price β ($/MWh) which indicates a generator's 
expectation of price per unit real power deviation from its scheduled 
operating point. It is to be noted that this scheduled operating point is known 
a priori to the generator and the ISO since the real-power market is already 
settled. 
Once the ISO receives all the offers, the market is settled on first price, 
uniform auction that means, all selected generators receive a uniform price ρ 
($/MWh), which is the highest priced offer accepted. As discussed in [27], 
[28], this provides the generators enough incentives to bid their true costs. 
The market price ρ is determined from the proposed model with the 
objective of minimizing total payment. The justification for selecting an 
objective function to minimize payment is that such a function seeks the 
lowest market price ρ from ISO’s viewpoint of procurement of the service 
and is thus analogous to maximization of social welfare. The constraints in 
the model include those related to uniform price formulation, market 
structure and reserve requirement. The schematic diagram of the proposed 
spinning reserve service market is shown in Figure 5.2. 
 
Spinning reserve market model
Uniform price formulations
genco genco
Bid for up and down spinning reserve
(Price β, ramp rates and capacity)
Obtain uniform market price
and call for spinning reserve
……
Market
Constraints
Reliability
Constraints
Obj Function:
Minimize
Payment
genco ……
 
Figure 5.2. Proposed Structure of the Spinning Reserve Service Market 
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The main contributions of the proposed market model are the following: 
• The spinning reserve service market is designed to operate at close to 
real-time and in parallel to the short-term real-power market. Thus 
generators will have enough scope to offer their capacities either to 
the real-power market or the spinning reserve market and thus have 
scope for fair competition. 
• The spinning reserve service market is independent of the real-power 
market settlement and considers real power schedules given. Such a 
separation of the energy market and the ancillary service market 
provides scope to introduce and handle bilateral transactions easily. 
• The spinning reserve service available to each generator takes into 
account a dynamic evaluation of the biddable capacity, to be 
discussed later. 
5.3 SPINNING RESERVE SERVICE PROCUREMENT AND 
MARKET SETTLEMENT 
As mentioned in Section-5.1, the proposed spinning reserve service market 
is an hour-ahead market. All generators submit their offers for next hour. 
The ISO contracts the selected generators to provide the service within their 
capacity limits in order to meet the system reserve requirement. The 
selection of appropriate generators is based on their offer prices and system 
load flow. For each hour, the offer price of the last selected unit determines 
the spinning reserve service market price for that hour. 
5.3.1 Structure of Spinning Reserve Service Offers 
In any system operation the ISO is expected to have information on the 
following parameters: 
• Hourly demand at each bus, PLoad 
• Maximum generation capacity of each generator, PMAX 
• Total amount of spinning reserve to be maintained in the system, TSR. 
Given the above information, the ISO receives offers for spinning reserve 
service from all synchronized generators for the next hour. The offers are 
submitted on the following lines- 
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• Quantity of spinning reserve service offered, SR, in MW 
• Offer price for providing spinning reserve service, β in $/MWh 
5.3.1.1 Quantity of Spinning Reserve Service Offered - Dynamic 
Biddable Capacity 
Since the market operates on a short-term basis, a generator can offer its 
service for the one-hour period between k-1 and k, depending on its actual 
generation PGEN, Actual at k-1 and the scheduled generation PGEN at k, ramp-
rate RAMP, and capacity PMAX. Figure 5.3 shows the dynamic evaluation of 
the spinning reserve capacity for a generating unit that is biddable at any 
particular hour. 
PMAX
Time
PGENPGEN
Capacity
Available
RAMP
Biddable
Capacity
kk-1 k+1
PGEN
 
Figure 5.3. Dynamic Model for Evaluation of Biddable Spinning Reserve Capacity based 
on Generator Ramping Capability and Available Capacity 
From Figure 5.3 we note the following: 
• The 'black' strip at k-1 shows the biddable capacity at k-1 for one-hour 
period between k-1 and k.  The biddable capacity is given by, 
( )1k,GENk,GEN1k,i PPRAMP −− −−=ℜ  (5.1) 
• The 'black' strip at k denotes the biddable capacity at k for the one-hour 
period between k and k+1, and which now corresponds to RAMP.  
( )k,GEN1k,GENk,i PPRAMP −−=ℜ +  (5.2) 
Since PGEN,k+1 is less than PGEN,k, the second component in (5.2) is 
negative and hence adds up with RAMP. Since inter-hour generation 
changes are limited by the ramp-rate, the biddable capacity in this case will 
be equal to RAMP. 
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Thus, to generalize, we can formulate a dynamic model of the biddable 
capacity as follows: 
( )( ){ }{ } 



−
−−=ℜ −
k,i
1k,ik,i
GENi
Actual,GENGENii
k,i PCAP
,PPRAMP,RAMPmin
min  (5.3) 
Once the upper limit on biddable capacity for a generator is thus 
calculated for an hour, a uniform random number generator is used to 
simulate the spinning reserve service capacity offers to the ISO, as follows: 
),0(uniformSR k,i ki, ℜ=  (5.4) 
It is to be noted that for hour k-1, PGEN, Actual is the same as scheduled 
value PGEN since actual invocation of spinning reserve service by ISO is not 
considered. This work only discusses the procurement/contracting 
mechanism and market design for spinning reserve service. The relation for 
spinning reserve service biddable capacity in (5.3) is thus general enough to 
handle situations when generation changes from providing spinning reserve 
service can also be included. 
5.3.2 Model Description 
Objective Function: 
The objective function considered for obtaining the market settlement, is 
minimization of ISO's total payments (5.5). As we have mentioned earlier, 
all contracted spinning reserve service providers will be paid the uniform 
market price ρ. Payment minimization would yield the lowest possible ρ and 
hence encourage participants to offer their true marginal costs. ( )∑ ×=
g
k,gSRSPJ ρ  (5.5) 
Constraints: 
Price determination: 
The highest priced offer selected by the ISO from amongst the offers for 
spinning reserve service determines the uniform market price. 
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k,gk,gk W⋅≥ βρ  (5.6) 
W is an integer variable denoting selection of a particular offer from a 
generator g, at hour k. 


=
=
0    W          selectednot  g''generator 
       W          selected, is g''generator 
kg,
kg, 1 
Reserve constraints: 
The ISO has to procure spinning reserves from the market so as to meet 
the stipulated requirements laid out by the policy-making regulator or such 
other body. For example, in the Nordic countries, Nordel (www.nordel.org) 
is responsible for evaluating such requirements on a fairly longer term basis, 
and the individual country ISOs are required to meet them during day-to-day 
operations. 
∑ ≥
g
kSRS TSRP k,g  (5.7) 
Spinning reserve selection limit 
The amount of spinning reserve service cleared in the market will be 
limited by the biddable capacity SR. 
k,iSRS SRP0 k,i ≤≤  (5.8) 
As mentioned earlier, SRi,k is obtained from the dynamic model of 
biddable spinning reserve capacity, discussed earlier in Section-5.3.1.1 and 
given by (5.3) and (5.4). 
5.4 CASE STUDY AND SCENARIO ANALYSES 
The same Cigré 32-bus test system used in earlier chapters (refer Appendix-
A) is used here to examine the proposed spinning reserve service market 
settlement and contracting scheme.  
It is extremely difficult to develop a generalized model for individual 
generator's price offer for the spinning reserve service market. Price offers 
submitted by generators can depend on several factors such as system 
conditions, real-power market prices, information on system contingencies, 
and so on. Moreover, they can also depend on an individual generator's 
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choice of operating strategy. In this work we consider two models for 
generators' offer price strategies, as described in the following sub-sections. 
5.4.1 Perfect Competition 
In this price offer strategy, we assume that the prices offered by generators 
to the ISO for spinning reserve service represent their true cost of providing 
the service and is independent of system information. In particular, we 
model it as a constant function with respect to the total system reserves, 
given by (5.9) and as shown in Figure 5.4. 
1  0
βo
SRES
β
 
Figure 5.4. Offer prices in spinning reserve markets independent of system conditions 
The offer prices can be represented as follows (Figure 5.4): 
i,ok,i ββ =  (5.9) 
Once the price offers for generators are simulated using the above offer 
price strategy, the proposed spinning reserve service market settlement 
model is used to obtain the optimal spinning reserve contracting decisions 
by the ISO, as shown in Table 5.1. It can be seen that generator "4072" is 
selected by the ISO throughout all the 24-hours, while "4011" and "4063" 
are also the major providers of spinning reserve service in the market. One 
point to be noted here is that the ISO's objective is to maintain a pre-
determined and mandatory fixed amount of spinning reserve in the system. 
However, because of the changing generation schedules of each generator, 
the spinning reserve service has to be contracted from different generators 
each hour, depending on their biddable capacity available and their 
respective offer prices. 
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Table 5.1. Generators contracted for spinning reserve services in the perfect market 
competition model 
Time, hour 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
4072 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
4011 - - - - 1 - 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 - 1 - 1 1
4012 - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - - 1 - - - - - -
4063 1 - 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1014 - - - - - - 1 1 1 - - 1 1 1 - - 1 1 - - 1 - - 1
1021 - - - - - - - - 1 - - - 1 - - - 1 1 - - - - - 1
The price-setter generator at each hour is shown in bold. 
Figure 5.5 shows the variation of system reserves over the day due to 
variations in system load. Also shown in Figure 5.5 is the spinning reserve 
service market price over the same day (note that the axes are different). It 
can be seen that the spinning reserve service market prices increase 
significantly, when system reserves are lower. During base-load hours when 
system reserves are in the order of 4000 MW, the spinning reserve service 
price is about 2$/MWh. On the other hand, during peak hours, system 
reserve is about 1500 MW (and one unit outage can cause serious 
consequences to the system, the spinning reserve service market price is 
about 4.5$/MWh. 
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Figure 5.5. Behavior of SRS market price vis-à-vis available capacity in the system, 
under perfect competition without contingency 
We now examine the spinning reserve service market when there is a 
sudden dip of 1200 MW in the total system capacity due to an outage of 
generator #4063. The outage takes place from hour 13 to hour 24. The 
spinning reserve service market is solved to obtain the new contract 
decisions (Table 5.2). We note that since "4063" is not available during 
hours 13-24, the ISO has to modify its contract with the generators in order 
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to meet the spinning reserve requirements, though it does not require to 
contract any new generator. 
Table 5.2. Generators contracted for spinning reserve services in perfect market with 
outage of generator #4063 during hours 13-24 
Time, hour 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
4072 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
4011 - - - - 1 - 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 - 1 - 1 1
4012 - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - 1 1 - - - - 1 1
4063 1 - 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 - - - - - - - - - - - -
1014 - - - - - - 1 1 1 - - 1 1 1 - 1 1 1 - - 1 - 1 1
1021 - - - - - - - - 1 - - - 1 - - - 1 1 - - 1 - 1 1
The price-setter generator at each hour is shown in bold. 
Figure 5.6 shows the hourly capacity available, without the outage and 
after the outage of generator "4063", and the corresponding spinning reserve 
service market prices respectively. Understandably the spinning reserve 
service market price increases during some of the hours, between hour 13-24, 
when more expensive offers are selected. 
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Figure 5.6. Comparison of capacity available with and without contingency and 
corresponding SRS market prices 
5.4.2 Imperfect Competition 
In this market model, the spinning reserve service offer prices submitted by 
generators are not expected to represent their true costs. In the present model 
we represent the offer prices by exponentially decaying function (5.10) of 
total system reserve (SRES). This in effect, is an imperfect competition 
model, though it is realistic enough since generators can be expected to have 
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such system information one hour ahead (they have this information in the 
Nordic system, put up on the ISO's web-sites). As can be noted from (5.10), 
when system reserve, SRES, tends to zero, the offer price approaches 
infinity, and when there is sufficient reserve, they approach the steady-state 
value of βo. 
( )kSRESi,ok,i e1 −−= ββ  (5.10) 
Where ∑
∑ ∑−
=
g
MAX
g i
LOADMAX
k
g
k,ig
P
PP
SRES  is the total normalized system 
reserve available at an hour. Figure 5.7 shows a typical plot of β as a 
function of SRES based on the function described in (5.10). 
1  0
βo
SRES
β
 
Figure 5.7. An imperfect market is constructed in this paper by modeling the SRS price 
offers from generators as exponentially decaying functions of total system reserve as 
shown in this figure. 
Simulating the price offers for generators using the above model, the 
spinning reserve service market settlement is obtained and consequently the 
optimal spinning reserve contracts as shown in Table 5.3. Comparing Table 
5.1 with Table 5.3, we find that there is very little change in the contracting 
decisions and only for a few hours, the decisions are different. This is not 
unexpected though, since we have considered all generators to be indulging 
in imperfect price offers simultaneously. 
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Table 5.3. Generators contracted for spinning reserve services in the imperfect market 
competition model 
Time, hour 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
4072 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
4011 - - - - 1 - 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 - 1 - 1 1
4012 - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - - 1 - - - - - -
4063 1 - 1 - 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 - 1 1 1 1
1014 - - - - - - 1 1 1 - - 1 1 1 - - 1 1 - - 1 - - 1
1021 - - - - - - - - 1 - - - 1 - - - 1 1 - - - - - 1
The price-setter generator at each hour is shown in bold. 
On the other hand, due to this simultaneous imperfect behavior of 
generators to offer prices according to (5.10), instead of their true costs, the 
spinning reserve service market price increases drastically compared to the 
perfect market. Figure 5.8 shows a comparison of spinning reserve service 
market prices under two different competition models. It can be observed 
that the imperfect competition model increases the market price several 
times, particularly during the high load periods. 
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Figure 5.8. Comparison of prices in perfect and imperfect markets without contingency 
Now we carry out the contingency study, as was carried out for the perfect 
market, by taking out generator "4063" during hours 13-24. It can be seen 
that the system reserves available reduces considerably and the market 
prices change for some hours, particularly those hours when the price setter 
changes (Figure 5.9). 
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Figure 5.9. Comparison of SRS market price with and without contingency 
Table 5.4 provides the contracting decisions by the ISO with regard to 
spinning reserve services in the imperfect competition environment. 
Table 5.4. Generators contracted for spinning reserve services in the imperfect market 
competition model 
Time, hour 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
4072 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
4011 - - - - 1 - 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 - 1 - 1 1
4012 - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - 1 1 - - - - 1 1
4063 1 - 1 - 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 - - - - - - - - - - - -
1014 - - - - - - 1 1 1 - - 1 1 1 - 1 1 1 - - 1 - 1 1
1021 - - - - - - - - 1 - - - 1 - - - 1 1 - - 1 - 1 1
The price-setter generator at each hour is shown in bold. 
5.4.3 Spinning Reserve Market Price versus Available 
Capacity Relationship 
In order to investigate the relationship between the hourly spinning reserve 
service market price and the available capacity we carry out an econometric 
analysis, using the method of ordinary least squares (OLS) [46]. In the 
method, the hourly SRS market price is regressed over the capacity available, 
for both, the perfect competition model and the imperfect competition model. 
The econometric exercise indicates that available capacity is a highly 
significant variable in predicting the spinning reserve service market prices. 
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Table 5.5 provides the estimated coefficients for both competition models, 
considering a logarithmic estimation model. In the table, N denotes the 
number of observations (N=24 for 24 hours), CAPAVL is the hourly 
spinning capacity available, which is the net of committed capacity and 
scheduled generation; ρ denotes the SRS market price and t-statistics 
indicate the level of significance of the estimated coefficients. Any value of 
t-statistics greater than 2.6, in absolute terms, reflects that the coefficient is 
significant at 1% [46]. R2 indicates how closely the estimated model fits the 
observed data. 
From the obtained values of R2 in Table 5.5, we see that CAPAVL 
explains up to about 41% of the variation in spinning reserve service market 
price variations in a perfect competition model. While, in an imperfect 
competition, CAPAVL is able to explain up to 84.5% of the variation in 
spinning reserve service market price. This also indicates that even in perfect 
markets, there would be some dependency of the spinning reserve service 
market price on CAPAVL and the market players would have every 
possibility to game unless the ISO takes care in removing market power 
from certain specific generators. 
Table 5.5. Estimates of spinning reserve market price, ln(ρ) 
 Intercept (t-statistics) 
ln(CAPAVL) 
(t-statistics) R
2 N 
Perfect competition model 2.546
*** 
(7.594) 
-0.394*** 
(-3.86) 0.41 24 
Imperfect competition model 6.55
*** 
(19.45) 
-1.12*** 
(-10.95) 0.845 24 
*** Denotes significance at 1% 
From the above analysis, we now develop the spinning reserve service 
price model for the two models of market competition since we note that 
CAPAVL is able to capture significantly the spinning reserve service price 
variations. We present the logarithmic model since it yields a better 
regression fit: 
( ) ( ) εCAPAVLln394.0546.2ρln +⋅−=     -MarketPerfect  (5.11) 
( ) ( ) εCAPAVLln12.155.6ρln +⋅−=  -MarketImperfect  (5.12) 
From (5.11) we find that the price elasticity with respect to capacity 
available is −0.394 in a perfect market, which implies that for every 1 MW 
reduction in system capacity available, the spinning reserve service market 
price is estimated to increase by $0.394. On the other hand, from (5.12) we 
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can interpret that if the market is imperfect, for every 1 MW reduction in 
system capacity available, the spinning reserve service market price is 
estimated to increase by $1.12. 
5.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This chapter presents the design of a spinning reserve market that operates 
on a close-to real time basis. The market for spinning reserve has been 
separated from the conventional energy market settlement. The ISO 
manages this market and procures spinning reserve services so as to 
minimize its payments towards these services. We incorporate bidding 
structures for the spinning reserve bids that are dependent on the system 
reserves. Two cases have been examined - a base case and a contingency 
case. It is found that the spinning reserve market price depends significantly 
on the system capacity available. Thereafter an econometric model has been 
constructed to determine the spinning reserve price versus system capacity 
relationship and a spinning reserve price model has been estimated. 
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CHAPTER 6  
FREQUENCY REGULATION AS AN 
ANCILLARY SERVICE* 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
Frequency regulation is the control of the system frequency by maintaining a 
balance between generation and load on a minute-to-minute basis within a 
control area. 
When a disturbance occurs in the system, there is a mismatch between the 
load and generation balance and the system frequency dips. The frequency 
dip results in an instantaneous increase in system generation, initiated by the 
governor responses. This is commonly known as governor regulation action 
or sometimes, primary regulation. The generation increase, taking place 
within a few seconds, combined with any frequency-dependent load 
reduction, helps arrest any further fall in frequency. Without any other 
control action, the system will stabilize and operate at a new steady-state 
frequency that is slightly less than nominal. This will, however, cause 
unscheduled power flows on the tie lines and lead to undesirable 
accumulation of area control error (ACE). To restore the system to nominal 
frequency, the generation set point of some units should be re-adjusted, 
based on the new generation-load balance. In many instances this is done 
                                                          
* Some parts of this chapter has been published in the following papers: 
• J. Zhong, K. Bhattacharya and J. Daalder, “Design of ancillary service markets: Reactive 
power and frequency regulation,” Proceedings of International Symposium on Bulk Power 
System Dynamics and Control, Onomichi City, Japan, August 2001, pp. 135-142. 
• J. Zhong and K. Bhattacharya, “Automatic balance service for frequency regulation,” 
presented at IEEE Power Engineering Society Transmission and Distribution Conference 
and Exposition, for student paper competition, Atlanta, GA, October 2001. (This paper 
received the First Prize in the Student Research Paper Competition). 
• J. Zhong and K. Bhattacharya, “Frequency Linked Pricing as an Instrument for Frequency 
Regulation in Deregulated Electricity Markets”, IEEE Power Engineering Society General 
Meeting, Toronto, Ontario Canada, July 13-17 (communicated). 
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through an automatic control action, known as the automatic generation 
control (AGC), while in some systems this is achieved through manual 
adjustment of the governor set-point, to balance the load. This control action, 
whether automatic or manual, is often referred to as secondary regulation. 
In deregulated power systems the Independent System Operator (ISO) or 
the Transmission System Operator (TSO), as the case may be, provides 
system frequency control services in three broad ways: 
¾ a primary regulation service from generating units that respond to 
frequency changes within a few seconds; 
¾ a secondary regulation service from generating units that respond to 
signals from the ISO within 5 to 10 minutes; and 
¾ a secondary regulation service from loads (customers) that respond to 
signals from the ISO within 5 to 10 minutes. 
A detailed discussion of the potential system control problems and issues, 
associated with frequency control in deregulation, has been provided in 
[47],[48]. Two possible structures for load frequency control have been 
proposed therein, the ‘charged’ and the ‘bilateral’. In the first structure, the 
ISO would purchase real power from the providers (can be generators or 
customers) on a near-to real-time basis. This structure is already being 
practiced in some countries, the Scandinavian countries, for example. The 
later structure could be where the ISO has no obligation to provide 
frequency control and customers purchase load matching contracts from 
their energy provider directly. In [49] and [50] a framework for price-based 
operation of AGC in deregulated electricity markets has been developed. 
Bilateral contracts, poolco based transactions and area regulation contracts 
have been considered for AGC.  
Most of the ISOs in the US and in the Union for the Co-ordination of 
Transmission of Electricity (UCTE) in Europe have an AGC system in place, 
for their secondary regulation. On the other hand, the Nordel and the UK 
systems, which are not part of UCTE, have opted for manual secondary 
control. The manual secondary control service is known as the balance 
service (or by similar names) since it continuously seeks to balance the 
system generation and consumption. The ISO of these respective countries 
accepts bids by volume (in MW) and price ($/MWh) from generators willing 
to quickly (max 10 minutes) increase or decrease their generation, or even 
consumers willing to increase or decrease their consumption. The bids for 
regulation are arranged in price order to form a "staircase" for each 
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operating hour. When regulation is needed, the ISO activates the most 
profitable bid for regulating up or down.  
At the end of each hour, the regulation price is determined in accordance 
with the most expensive measure taken during upward regulation (the 
purchase of balance energy), or the cheapest measure taken during 
downward regulation (the sell of balance energy), used during the hour. The 
final regulation price applies to all selected balance service providers [51], 
[52]. 
Although manual secondary control has so far performed satisfactorily in 
most systems, where it has been in use, there are apprehensions that in the 
increasingly competitive market environment with tighter operating regimes, 
the ISO could encounter situations when manual balancing does not perform 
as expected. Since these markets operate at very close to real-time, dominant 
providers in the balance service markets can have advantage of price setting 
and realize unrealistic profits. This can particularly be true when the system 
is at a critical operating point and reserve margins available to the ISO are 
low. These factors lead us to devise a secondary frequency control scheme 
that combines the existing balance service market within an AGC type 
mechanism that works on market price signals. 
To this effect, in this chapter we develop a market framework for 
Automatic Balance Services (ABS), both for primary as well as secondary 
regulation. The market structure is based on the assumption that the balance 
providers automatically respond to price signals sent by the ISO, when there 
is a frequency excursion in the system. These price signals are frequency 
dependent. Subsequently, optimization models are proposed to obtain the 
market clearing prices for the individual regulation services. Finally, the 
optimum frequency regulation contracts are incorporated within a dynamic 
simulation model of a two control-area system, each area having multiple 
balance service providers (both generators and loads), to demonstrate the 
effectiveness of the proposed scheme. 
Real-time frequency-linked price signals have been used earlier and have 
been shown to achieve improved frequency regulation and control 
performances [53], [54]. Berger and Schweppe [53] demonstrated that real-
time pricing in the presence of system dynamics could aid in load-frequency 
control. In [54] a pricing scheme was suggested that gives the importing area 
a signal in terms of increased price for any increment in power drawn, from 
scheduled value. The increase in price is viewed as a penalty that 
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discourages deviation from the scheduled power flow and thereby ensures 
grid discipline. 
6.2 DESIGN OF A FREQUENCY REGULATION MARKET 
The proposed frequency regulation market structure is similar to a power 
pool where all service providers submit their bid-offers. The bid offers can 
be for, both primary and secondary regulation services. A notable aspect of 
the bid offers is the linkage of price and quantity offers with the frequency. 
The combined frequency regulation service market operates in two stages. 
In the first stage the market prices for primary and secondary regulation 
service is determined by the ISO based on bids obtained. The second stage is 
the real-time activation of the services by the ISO based on signals derived 
from system frequency deviation. The combined framework of the 
frequency regulation service scheme is shown in Figure 6.1. 
genco genco customer customer…… ……
ISO
(Optimization)
Bid for Primary and Secondary Regulations
(Price η and Quantity γ)
 Activation of
Frequency Control
Services
Market Price of primary and
secondary regulation
 
Figure 6.1 Framework of the Primary and Secondary Maket  
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6.2.1 Primary Regulation 
The proposed scheme considers that γPR,i is the quantity per unit market price 
of primary frequency regulation offered by a genco ‘i’. Similarly, ηPR,i is the 
price per unit of frequency deviation, offered by the genco ‘i’ (Table 6.1). 
Say, if unit-1 offers to increase its generation by 1.95% for a 1% increase in 
price, and assuming a market price of $150/MWh, we have, 
MWh/$
MW.u.p013.0
%1MWh/$150
MW.u.p%95.1
1 =⋅=γ  
This means that a genco bidding γ1=0.013p.u MW/$/MWh is offering 
0.013p.u.MW per unit price change. 
Table 6.1 Frequency-linked bid offers for primary regulation 
From gencos From Customers  
Quantity Price Quantity Price 
Primary Regulation γPR,i p.u.MW/($/MWh) ηPR,i ($/MWh-Hz) -- -- 
The market is settled based on the price and quantity offers from all 
gencos, as discussed in the optimization model later. The ISO determines the 
primary regulation market price PPR, specified in per unit of frequency 
excursion, from the generators’ bid price parameters γPR,i and ηPR,i (i=1,…,n) 
as well as their location in the system. The contracted gencos receive the 
market price PPR. Primary regulation services are activated by PPR that is sent 
when there is a frequency excursion in the system. The generating units 
contracting this service are prepared to increase or reduce their generation 
instantaneously as per the following relation: 
areai,PRPRgi fPP ∆⋅⋅−=∆ γ  (6.1) 
A dynamic model demonstrating how gencos would participate and 
respond to the ISO’s frequency-linked price signal, for primary frequency 
control within a control area, is shown in Figure 6.2. As seen, each 
contracted genco is available to provide γPR,i amount of primary control 
service which is activated by the primary frequency regulation market price 
signal PPR. 
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Figure 6.2 Dynamic Model of Primary Control of Frequency within a Contract Area, A, 
from Contracted Gencos 
6.2.1.1 Settlement of Primary Regulation Service Market 
Each genco contracting for primary regulation provides the ISO a bid price 
ηPR,i and a bid quantity γPR,i. Once the ISO receives all the bids, it determines 
a uniform market price, PPR. It is assumed that the ISO has information on 
the location from which a bid offer will be met by the provider. This will 
enable taking into account the system loss factors at different nodes, which 
are dependent on load and generation pattern of the system. Loss factors are 
then incorporated in the submitted bids since a frequency regulation service 
by a remotely located genco could lead to increased losses in the network. 
All the bids are then arranged in ascending order of their (revised) prices and 
when the sum of the offered quantity satisfies the regulation requirement, the 
market price is obtained (Figure 6.3). PPR is the price that all contracted 
gencos, providing the primary frequency regulation service, will receive. 
Chapter 6 Frequency Regulation as an Ancillary Service 
 101
Generators
 Offer
Prices
Bid Quality, p.u.MW/($/MWh)
B
id
 P
ric
e,
 $
/M
W
h-
H
z
Primary
Regulation
Requirement
Market Price
PPR
 
Figure 6.3 Primary Regulation Market Settlement (Note that the price offers are modified 
with respective loss factors that are determined a priori by the ISO.) 
The optimization model to determine the primary regulation market price 
can be formulated as follows: 
Objective Function: Minimize Payment for Primary Regulation Service 
Minimize ∑ ⋅⋅=
i
PRi,PRi,PR PUPRobj γ  (6.2) 
Constraints: 
PR
i
i,PRi,PRi,PR DLFU ≥⋅⋅∑ γ  (6.3) 
niPU PRi,PRi,PR ∈∀≤⋅γ  (6.4) 

=
selectednotgenerator ofoffer  bid
selectedgenerator  ofoffer  bid
i0
i1
U i,PR  
UPR,i is a binary variable associated with the selection of a particular bid 
offer for primary regulation. 
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6.2.2 Secondary Regulation 
These services are contracted in order to restore the system frequency to 
nominal (say 50 Hz) after a disturbance. This can be achieved either by 
increasing/reducing an area’s total generation or by reducing / increasing an 
area’s total demand. The secondary regulation market design includes bids 
from customers also, in addition to those from gencos. The market is settled 
in the same way as that for the primary regulation market. Table 6.2 shows 
the proposed structure of bid price and quantity for the participants of the 
secondary-up and -down regulation market. The secondary regulation bid 
ηSR is the price per unit of energy while γSR is the quantity offered per unit of 
price. 
Table 6.2 Bid offers for secondary regulation 
From gencos From Customers  
Quantity Price Quantity Price 
Secondary Up 
Regulation 
γSR,iUP  
(p.u.MW/($/MWh))
ηSR,iUP  
(($/MWh)/MWh)
γSR,iUP 
(p.u.MW/($/MWh)) 
ηSR,iUP 
(($/MWh)/MWh)
Secondary Down 
Regulation 
γSR,iDN  
(p.u.MW/($/MWh))
ηSR,iDN 
(($/MWh)/MWh)
γSR,iDN  
(p.u.MW/($/MWh)) 
ηSR,iDN 
(($/MWh)/MWh)
Secondary Regulation Service from Generators: We first consider the case 
of gencos contracting for secondary regulation services. The contracted 
gencos respond to the price-linked signal sent out by the ISO according to 
their response rates depending on their technical characteristic or on 
economical criteria. Frequency control in this case can be achieved by 
controlling generation in an area through a real-time secondary regulation. 
The price-linked control signal is of the form: 
∫−=∆ dt)t(ACEP)t( areaarea,SRρ  (6.5) 
PSR is the area’s secondary regulation price that is obtained from the 
market settlement model, to be discussed next. The generators contracted to 
respond to the control signal increase or decrease their generation as per the 
following relation: 
ργ ∆⋅=∆ i,SRgiP  (6.6) 
Secondary Regulation Service from Customers: In this case, the 
contracted customers respond to the price-linked control signal sent by the 
ISO by increasing or reducing their demand, according to their response 
rates that may depend on their load characteristic or economical criteria. The 
price-linked signal is the same, as described by (6.5). The loads contracted to 
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respond to this signal, increase or decrease their load as per the following 
relation: 
ργ ∆⋅−=∆ Di,SRdiP  (6.7) 
6.2.2.1 Settlement of Secondary Regulation Service Market 
Generators and customers can both provide the regulation bid, quantity 
γSR,iUP at price ηSR,iUP for up-regulation, and γSR,iDN at price ηSR,iDN for down-
regulation. After receiving the bid information, the ISO determines the up-
regulation market price PSRUP and the down-regulation market price PSRDN, 
such that the payment for secondary regulation service is minimal and the 
social welfare is maximized. In this case also, the loss factors associated 
with the location of each bid are taken into account within the optimization 
framework. 
All up-regulation bids are arranged in ascending order and all down-
regulation bids are arranged in descending order using the real-power spot 
price as the reference point (Figure 6.4). PSRUP and PSRDN are decided by the 
ISO on the short-term (hour to hour), based on the requirements of 
secondary regulation by the system. 
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Figure 6.4 Secondary Regulation Service Bid Curve 
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The market settlement is obtained from an optimization model that seeks 
the secondary (up or down) regulation market prices, based on generators’ 
bids. 
Objective Function: Minimize Payment for Secondary Regulation Service 
Minimize ∑∑ ⋅⋅+⋅⋅=
i
DN
SR
DN
i,SR
DN
i,SR
i
UP
SR
UP
i,SR
UP
i,SR PUPUSRobj γγ  (6.8) 
Constraints: 
UP
SR
i
i,SR
UP
i,SR
UP
i,SR DLFU ≥⋅⋅∑ γ  (6.9) 
niPU UPSR
UP
i,SR
UP
i,SR ∈∀≤⋅γ  (6.10) 
DN
SR
i
i,SR
DN
i,SR
DN
i,SR DLFU ≤⋅⋅∑ γ  (6.11) 
niPU DNSR
DN
i,SR
DN
i,SR ∈∀≥⋅γ  (6.12) 

=
selectednotgenerator ofoffer  bid
selectedgenerator ofoffer  bid
i0
i1
U i,SR  
USR,iUP and USR,iDN are binary variables associated with the selection of a 
bid for secondary regulation services. 
6.3 CASE STUDY 
A two-area interconnected power system is now considered to examine the 
proposed market dynamics and the performance of frequency-linked prices 
on regulation services. We assume that the frequency regulation service 
providers provide their regulation service to their respective area’s ISO only. 
Figure 6.5 shows the dynamic model of a two-area interconnected power 
system with the proposed primary and secondary control mechanisms. 
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Figure 6.5 Dynamic Model of Primary and Secondary Control 
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6.3.1 Primary Regulation 
In Area-A, we assume that there are 10 generators willing to provide the 
primary regulation service. Their corresponding bid offers, ηPR,i and γPR,i, 
and those selected by the ISO, are shown in Table 6.3. 
Table 6.3 Primary regulation bid in Area-A 
Provider i 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
ηPR,i ($/MWh-Hz) 0.23 0.37 0.31 0.26 0.26 0.24 0.27 0.37 0.21 0.30 
γPR,i p.u.MW/($/MWh) 0.10 0.11 0.27 0.36 0.42 0.14 0.18 0.10 0.19 0.17 
Loss Factor 0.96 0.96 0.98 0.95 0.96 0.95 0.96 0.97 0.96 0.96 
(The selected offers are underlined) 
The primary regulation service providers are selected based on the 
optimization model discussed in Section-6.2.1. The primary regulation 
market price is 0.26 $/MWh-Hz and the total primary regulation energy 
cleared in the market is 0.8 p.u.MW. 
In Area-B, we assume that there are 8 generators willing to provide the 
primary regulation service. The primary regulation bid offers, ηPR,i and γPR,i, 
and those selected by the ISO, are shown in Table 6.4. 
Table 6.4 Primary regulation bid in Area-B 
Provider i 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
ηPR,i ($/MWh-Hz) 0.23 0.37 0.31 0.26 0.26 0.24 0.27 0.37 
γPR,i p.u.MW/($/MWh) 0.08 0.27 0.30 0.13 0.10 0.20 0.10 0.11 
Loss Factor 0.95 0.95 0.98 0.97 0.95 0.98 0.95 0.96 
(The selected offers are underlined) 
6.3.2 Secondary Regulation 
Now we consider 11 providers, comprising 6 generators and 5 customers 
willing to provide the secondary regulation services in Area-A. The 
secondary up and down bid prices ηSR,iUP and ηSR,iDN and the respective bid 
quantities γSR,iUP and γSR,iDN , and those bids selected by the ISO are shown in 
Table 6.5. 
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Table 6.5 Secondary regulation bid in Area-A 
Up Regulation From Generators From Customers 
Provider i 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
ηSR,iUP ($/MWh)/MWh 0.40 0.32 0.40 0.35 0.23 0.33 0.23 0.25 0.33 0.29 0.27
γSR,iUPp.u.MW/($/MWh) 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.04
Loss Factor 0.98 0.95 0.97 0.95 0.95 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.96 0.97 0.96
Down Regulation From Generators From Customers 
Provider i 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
ηSR,iDN (($/MWh)/MWh) 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.12 0.17 0.05 0.13 0.16 0.06 0.02 0.10
γSR,iDN p.u.MW/($/MWh) 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03
Loss Factor 0.98 0.95 0.97 0.95 0.95 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.96 0.97 0.96
(The selected offers are underlined) 
In Area-B we assume that 9 providers, comprising 5 generators and 4 
loads, are willing to provide secondary regulation services. Their 
corresponding bid parameters and those selected by the ISO are shown in 
Table 6.6. 
Table 6.6 Secondary regulation bid in Area-B 
Up Regulation From Generators From Customers 
Provider i 1 2 3 4 5 7 8 9 10 
ηSR,iUP ($/MWh)/MWh 0.21 0.30 0.40 0.34 0.40 0.35 0.23 0.33 0.23 
γSR,iUP p.u.MW/($/MWh) 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 
Loss Factor 0.97 0.98 0.96 0.95 097 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.96 
Down Regulation From Generators From Customers 
Provider i 1 2 3 4 5 7 8 9 10 
ηSR,iDN (($/MWh)/MWh) 0.05 0.13 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.12 0.17 
γSR,iDN p.u.MW/($/MWh) 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.01 
Loss Factor 0.97 0.98 0.96 0.95 097 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.96 
(The selected offers are underlined) 
The combined solution to the secondary regulation service market is given 
in Table 6.7. 
Table 6.7 Market clearing of secondary regulation service 
Area  Market Clearing Price $/MWh Quantity Cleared p.u.MW 
Up Regulation 0.27 0.11 A 
Down Regulation 0.10 0.11 
Up Regulation 0.33 0.095 B Down Regulation 0.09 0.095 
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6.3.3 System Performance with Primary and Secondary 
Regulation Services 
The dynamic models shown in Figure 6.2 and Figure 6.5 are developed 
using small perturbation analysis of the system around a nominal operating 
point. The system can be represented using the state-space equations as 
p)t(xA
dt
)t(xd Γ+=  (6.13) 
In the above, x(t) is the state-vector comprising the system variables, p is 
the perturbation. A and Γ are state and perturbation matrices of appropriate 
dimensions, respectively. 
Now the selected sets of primary and secondary regulation service 
providers in two control areas are incorporated for the combined frequency 
regulation simulation. Two perturbations are considered in Area-A during a 
150-seconds simulation period. The first is a 1% increase in load at time t=0 
and the second is a 5% increase in load at time t=12 second. 
6.3.3.1 Simulation Results of Primary Regulation 
Figure 6.6 shows the plot of frequency as primary regulation services are 
activated. The system frequency settles to a new steady-state value with the 
primary regulation service. The primary regulation performances of the 
selected primary regulation providers, generators on bus 1,5,6,9, are plotted 
in Figure 6.7. 
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Figure 6.6 Area-A Frequency Plot with Primary Regulation 
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Figure 6.7 Area-A Primary Control Through Generators 
6.3.3.2 Simulation Results of Primary and Secondary Regulation 
Figure 6.8 shows the plot of the frequency following the two perturbations 
with primary and secondary regulation services activated. It is seen that the 
frequency is brought back to the nominal (50 Hz) through secondary 
regulation in about 2 minutes. 
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Figure 6.8 Area-A Frequency Plot With Primary and Secondary Regulation 
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Figure 6.9, Figure 6.10 and Figure 6.11 plot the generators’ participation 
in the frequency control in Area-A. Figure 6.9 shows primary control 
responses of three generators that only provide primary regulation. Figure 
6.10 shows the plot of the generator output that provides both primary and 
secondary regulation. Figure 6.11 shows the plot of the generator output that 
provides only secondary regulation.  
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Figure 6.9 Area-A Primary Control Action from Generator 1-3 
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Figure 6.10 Area-A Primary and Secondary Control Action from Generator-4 
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Figure 6.11 Area-A Secondary Control Only from Generator-5 
6.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This chapter attempts to examine frequency regulation issues in the context 
of power sector deregulation. We propose a frequency-linked bidding 
structure for the frequency regulation service market. The participating 
parties are envisaged to respond to price signals sent out by the ISO, based 
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on their bid offers. An optimization scheme has been developed both for 
primary and secondary regulation services, to address the transmission 
system operator’s problem of determining the best contracts. Further, a 
dynamic simulation model is developed for a two-area interconnected power 
system that incorporates the above features of frequency regulation services 
to examine the performance of the optimum regulation contracts. 
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CHAPTER 7  
CONCLUSIONS 
7.1 MAIN CONCLUSIONS AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
This thesis attempts to examine the various issues involved in electric power 
ancillary services in the context of power sector deregulation. Particular 
emphasis is on the study of reactive power service, spinning reserve service 
and frequency regulation service, and how they are managed by the system 
operator in deregulated markets. 
To this effect, a broad-ranging overview of ancillary service management 
in USA, Europe and Australia, has been presented. The issues pertaining to 
independent generators acting as reactive power providers in competitive 
markets have been brought out. We develop a reactive power market 
structure based on the analysis of reactive power costs from synchronous 
generators. 
Subsequently, an offer price structure is incorporated with an OPF model 
and a two-step optimization procedure is used to determine the optimal 
reactive power contracts. The optimization scheme takes into account the 
marginal benefits from reactive power support at a system bus vis-á-vis the 
payment to be made by the ISO, by way of reactive power procurement. 
Further, a competitive reactive power market is designed, and the issue is 
extended to voltage control areas. Uniform market prices for individual 
voltage control areas are obtained in the competitive market. Different 
gaming scenarios are simulated to examine the possibility of market power 
with contracted providers.  
The thesis further examines the description of competitive market for 
spinning reserve services. Optimal contracting of spinning reserves has been 
discussed. 
Subsequently, we propose a frequency-linked offer price structure for the 
frequency regulation service market. The participating parties are envisaged 
to respond to price signals sent out by the ISO, based on their offers. An 
optimization scheme has been developed, both for primary and secondary 
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regulation services, to address the ISO’s problem of determining the best 
contracts. Further, a dynamic simulation model is developed for a two-area 
interconnected power system that incorporates the above features of 
frequency regulation services to examine the performance of the optimum 
regulation contracts. 
7.2 SCOPE FOR FUTURE WORK 
Research work on electric power ancillary services, in the context of 
electricity market deregulation, has been going on in many countries. The 
market structures differ, so do the structure of their ancillary service markets. 
Therefore, obtaining a conclusion and a universal market structure for these 
services is very difficult. There are tremendous scopes for work in this area 
since not much has yet been said on this topic. 
Some of the important aspects and issues that need to be addressed in this 
area are the following: 
• Broadening the scope of the ancillary service market to include a large 
section of providers. This could help reduce market power in certain 
cases, particularly for reactive power markets, by including capacity 
banks, SVCs, etc. 
• Examine the possibility of attracting customers to this market and 
offering their services in this market, such as in the form of 
interruptible loads. 
• With the entry of various distributed generation sources that inject 
energy into the grid at various sub-transmission voltage levels, issues  
of ancillary service management becomes more complex and need to 
be studied.  
• Similarly, there is a need to examine how ancillary services are 
affected by the introduction of non-conventional energy sources, such 
as wind power, into the grid. 
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 APPENDICES 
Appendix-A CIGRÉ 32-BUS SYSTEM 
The Cigré 32-bus test system [55], shown in Figure A.1, has been used in 
this thesis to evaluate the various ancillary service procurement plans for the 
ISO. The system consists of four major areas: 
North: with basically hydro generation and some load. 
Central: with a large amount of load and rather large thermal power 
generation. 
Southwest: with a few thermal units and some load. 
External: connected to the North.  It has a mix of generation and load. 
The main power transfer is from “north” to “central”. The “external” 
system consists of a very simplified network. The main transmission system 
is designed for 400 kV. There are also some regional systems at 130kV and 
220kV. The number of buses at 400kV, 220kV and 130kV are 19, 2 and 11 
respectively. In the Cigré test system, there are 19 generators, 1 synchronous 
condenser, 10 shunt capacitors and 2 inductors. The data of generators and 
shunts is given in Table A.1. Bus 4011 is selected as the slack bus. 
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Figure A.1 Cigré 32-bus Test System Network Configuration 
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Table A.1 Data of generators and capacitors for Cigré 32-bus system 
Bus no. Pmax (MW) Qmax (MVAr) Qmin (MVAr) Qsh (MVAr) 
4072 4500 1500 -750 0 
4071 500 167 -84 -400 
4011 1000 333 -167 0 
4012 800 267 -133 -100 
4021 300 100 -50 0 
4031 350 117 -59 0 
4042 700 233 0 0 
4041 0 300 -200 200 
4062 600 200 0 0 
4063 1200 400 0 0 
4051 700 233 0 100 
4047 1200 400 0 0 
2032 850 283 -142 0 
1013 600 200 -100 0 
1012 800 267 -133 0 
1014 700 233 -117 0 
1022 250 134 -67 50 
1021 600 200 -100 0 
1043 200 67 0 150 
1042 400 133 0 0 
2031    100 
1011    200 
1041    600 
1044    800 
1045    700 
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Appendix-B MODELING BILATERAL CONTRACTS 
In bilateral markets, the energy sell/buy contracts (bilateral contracts) 
between independent generators and customers are assumed to have been 
signed in advance. In order to appropriately represent such power 
transactions, a bilateral transaction matrix ‘XP’, representing all 
combinations of trades between participating parties, is created. In this 
appendix, we discuss the modeling of the bilateral transactions in details. 
The model is based on the following features: 
¾ All contracts between generators and customers are represented using 
random numbers. 
¾ The random numbers associated with all contracts have the same 
probability. 
¾ The sum of all contracts entered into, by one customer, equals the 
total demand of the said customer. 
¾ The sum of all contract entered into by one generator, equals the 
contracted generation of the said generator. 
The bilateral contracted transactions between a generator ‘gen’ and a 
customer ‘dem’ at a bus are modeled as following steps: 
1) The demand of each bus ‘dem’ is given as Pddem. 
2) Set a uniformly distributed random number RPggen for each generator 
bus in the range (0.8*Pmaxgen, Pmaxgen), where Pmaxgen is the upper 
limit of the generation at bus ‘gen’. To match the total generation and 
total demand, the contracted generation, congenPg , for each generator is 
set as ∑∑ ×= dem dem
gen
gen
gencon
gen PdRPg
RPg
Pg . So the sum of all congenPg is the 
same as the sum of all Pddem. 
3) Set a uniformly distributed random number RTrdem,gen for each 
contracts between generator ‘gen’ and customer at bus ‘dem’ in the 
range ( )congenPgLF,0 × , where LF is loss factor. 
4) Scale the random number RTrdem,gen to match the demand on each load 
bus. We get a set of preliminary contract value: 
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dem
gen
gen,dem
gen,dem
gen,dem PdRTr
RTr
Tr ×= ∑
. 
5) The final bilateral contracted exchange power, con gen,demXP , are given by 
equation (B.1).  
∑∑ ×

 −+=
dem
gen,dem
gen,dem
dem
gen,dem
con
gengen,dem
con
gen,dem Tr
Tr
TrPgTrXP  (B.1) 
We can prove that these random bilateral transactions satisfy two rules: a) 
the sum of all contracts with one customer at load bus ‘dem’ equal to the 
demand Pddem. b) the sum of all contracts with one generator at bus ‘gen’ 
equal to congenPg . 
